Linear Inequality Methods to Enforce Partnerships under Uncertainty: An Overview

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 311-336

  D'Aspremont, Claude ^a   Gérard Varet, Louis André ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; partnership; team moral hazard; folk theorem

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013198593     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0675     Document Type: Article

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