Investment with weak contract enforcement: Evidence from Hungary during transition

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 75-91

  Cungu, Azeta ^a   Gow, Hamish ^b   Swinnen, Johan F M ^c   Vranken, Liesbet ^c,d  

^a FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS   (Italy)

^b MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

^d FLEMISH INSTITUTE FOR TECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH VITO   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Contract enforcement; Economic transition; Hold ups; Reforms

Indexed keywords

EID: 52449104382     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: 14643618     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbn001     Document Type: Article

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