Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: How much do we need to know about risk preferences?

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 19, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 203-225

  Witt, Ulrich ^a   Schubert, Christian ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Constitutional preferences; Innovation; Original position; Risk preferences; Social contract

Indexed keywords

EID: 52249122382     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9044-6     Document Type: Article

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