Why are offices for sale in China?: A case study of the office-selling chain in Heilongjiang Province

Asian Survey

Volumn 48, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 558-579

  Zhu, Jiangnan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bribe; BSO; Corruption; Monitor; Promotion; Selling

Indexed keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK; CORRUPTION; MANAGEMENT PRACTICE; OFFICE LOCATION; PARALLEL ECONOMY; POWER RELATIONS;

ASIA; CHINA; EURASIA; FAR EAST; HEILONGJIANG;

EID: 51349144155     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: 1533838X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.2008.48.4.558     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. The basic facts in this paper were collected from news reports. I also did 26 field interviews to learn about the details of the Heilongjiang case and other buying and selling offices (BSO) cases, as well as corruption in China in general. My interviewees included officials, journalists, and scholars in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Jiangxi. As promised, I will keep their identities confidential. All of my interviewees generously allowed me to take notes during the conversation. I am indebted to them for the valuable information. To ensure metethodological reliability in the interviews, I tried to ask the same questions of different people in order to find common answers.
2. Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design - Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004).
3. See also Andrew Wedeman, "The Intensification of Corruption in China," China Quarterly 180 (December 2004), pp. 895-921. Manion's data are mainly from the procuratorate. Wedeman draws together the data from the Party systems - discipline inspection, state supervision, and the procuratorate. They find similar trends: The number of revealed cases and the amount ot money involved have increased greatly in recent years. More senior officials have been investigated. Wedeman also argues that "whereas the first stages of reform witnessed a quantitative increase in corruption, during the 1990s corruption underwent a qualitative change as high-level. high-stakes corruption increased more rapidly than other forms of official malfeasance" (p.895).
4. Ting Gong, "Forms and Characteristics of China's Corruption in the 1990s: Change with Continuity," Communist and Post Communist Studies 3300:33 (September 1997), pp. 277-88.
5. See also Ting Gong, The Politics of Corruption in Contemporary China: An Analysis of Policy Outcomes (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994);
6. and Wedeman, "The Intensification of Corruption in China." They argue corruption in China does not change only in quantity but also in quality. Gong stresses more the complex forms of corruption, e.g., that "corruption is a kind of behavior which responds to political and economic changes and hence whose forms vary with social climates" (Gong, "Forms and Characteristics," p. 278).
7. "Public power" here refers to the power, or authority, control, and influence possessed by governmental and government officials to deal with public affairs, maintain social order, and increase the social welfare in general.
8. I owe this point to my anonymous reader.
9. The main narrative for Case-H id from Lu Lei, Duan Hongquing, and Wu Xiaoliang, "Chaijie Heilongjiang Maiguanlian" [Disentagling the office-selling chain in the province of Heilongjiang], Caijing [Finance and Economy] (Beijing) 132 (May 2005), pp. 25-39.
10. "Monitoring of corruption" includes preventing, detecting, supervising, and punishing corruption. In China, two types of agencies are primarily responsible, the Central Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC) and the procuratorates.
11. The "eight-year war" refers to the anti-Japanese war in China during World War Two. Here, it describes the long-time hardship.
12. Wen Feng, Zhonggong 2003-2004 Tanguan Daqingxi [The CCP purge of corrupt officials, 2003 2004] (Hong Kong: Tidetime Media Ltd., 2004), p. 53.
13. Yasheng Huang, Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations during the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 92.
14. Several persons paid bribes just to "maintain their positions," meaning to keep their current posts and not to be demoted or removed from office.
15. I thank the anonymous reader for this point and for providing me the examples of France and Britain.
16. Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese Communist Party (Stanford. Calif.: Stanford University Pres, 2000), p. 109.
17. Jean Tirole, "The Internal Organization of Government," Oxford Economic Papers, new series, 46:1 (January 1994), p. 7.
18. In the. retrospective theory of voting, voters cast votes based on knowledge of their own lives during the incumbent's administration. The need not know precise economic or foreign policies to evaluate the incumbent's performance. They need only calculate the changes in their own welfare. See V. O. Key, The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936 1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966);
19. and Morris Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).
20. Roger B. Myerson. "Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy," Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1:1 (January 2006), 3-23.
21. Xu Cheng'an, "Lun woguo de Granbu Xuanba Zhidu Gaige Cong Maimaiguan Xianxiang Qieru de Fenxi" [About the reform of our cadre selection systems Starting from an analysis of the BSO phenomenon], Tianze Jingji Yanjiusuo [Unirule Institute of Economics], October 30, 2006, . Xu divides office buyers by their qualification for promotion qualified cadres are passive buyers: Unqualified ones are active.
22. Interview notes, no. 3 (Beijing), July 26, 2005.
23. Interview notes, no. 26 (Tianjin), August 2006.
24. "Banian 17 Wei Jiaotong Tingzhang Luoma, Jiaotong Xitong Yuanhe Chengwei Fubai Zhongzaiqu?" [17 heads of transportation bureaus have been penalized in eight years, why does the transportation sector become a major disaster area of corruption?], Fazhi Xinwen [Legal News], in Xinhua Wang [New China Net], March 29, 2005, .
25. Chen Yiliang, "Ruhe Zhengzhi Sifa Fubai?" [How to deal with judicial corruption?], Fazhi Pindao [Legal Channel], in Nanfang Wang [South China Net], August 23,2006, .
26. Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing, China: From Revolution through Reform 2nd. ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), pp. 197-99.
27. Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca, N. Y: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 147.
28. Interview notes, no. 3.
29. Li Demin, "Renmin Shiping: 'Znongzubu de Chuzhang'yu Tanguan de 'Yisi Yisi'" [People's comments: 'a bureau-leader ot the CDOO' and a corrupt cadre's 'bribery'], Guardian [Opinion], Renmin Wang [People's Net], October 13, 2006, .
30. Interview notes, no. 3.
31. "Zhongjiwei Diaocha Anhui Shengwei Yuan Fushuji; Jiang Qianshe Dapi Guanyuan" [The CDIC investigate the former vice-Party secretary of Anhui Province; a large number of officials will be involved], Hainan Shichuang [Hainan Review], Renmin Wang, November 30, 2006, .
32. Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China, p. 146. This point is also verified by several of my interviewees and many news reports.
33. Ibid., p. 145.
34. Interview notes, no. 1 (Beijing), July 1, 2004.
35. Interview notes, no. 3.
36. "Jutan Yang Gongquan Shi Ruhe Dangshang Xianwei Shup de?" [How did the big corrupt official Yang Gongquan become the county Party secretary?], Renmin Wang, in Meiti Shiping [Media Comments], Xinhua Wang, August 11, 2006, .
37. The detailed information on Li Gang and other bribery cases in Case-H in this section was collected during my fieldwork in 2005 and quoted from interview notes, no. 3.
38. Lynn T. White, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 66-67.
39. Lu, Duan, and Wu, "Chaijie Heilongjiang Maiguanlian," p. 32.
40. See Manion, Corruption by Design, pp. 122-23.
41. "Hunan: Qian Jiwei Shuji Lichen Fanfubai zhi Jian" [Hunan: The former Party secretary of the provincial DIC talked about the difficulties of anti-corruption], Nanfang Zhoumo [South China Weekend] (Guangzhou), in the News of the Communist Party of China, Renmin Wang, November 2, 2006, .
42. Interview notes, no. 25 (Beijing), August 2006.
43. Xu, "Lim Woguo de Ganbu Xuanba Zhidu Gaige."
44. The above information is quoted, respectively, from the following news reports: "Cong Li Gang Dang Guan de 'Mijue' Shuoqi [Starting from Li Gang's "secrets" of being a leader], Xinhua She [New China News Agency], in Xinhua Wang, November 16, 2004,
45. "Heilongjiang Yuan Suihua Shiwei Shuji Ma De Yin Maiguan Shouhui Bei Panchu Sixing" [The former Party secretary of Suihua in Heilongjiang Province Ma De got the death penalty because of selling offices and taking bribes], Zhongguo Xinwen Wang [China News Net], July 28, 2006, in Xinlang Xinwen [Sina News],
46. "Heilongjiang Sheng Zhengxie Yuan Fuzhuxi Han Guizhi Yishen Bei Pan Sihuan" [Former vice-chair of the PPPCC of Heilongjiang Han Guizhi was sentenced to death with respite], Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], December 16, 2005, .
47. Francois-Yves Damon, "Corruption in Mainland China Today: Data and Law in Dubious Battle," in Fighting Corruption Asia: Causes, Effects, and Remedies, eds. John Kidd and Frank-Jurgen Richter (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 2003), pp. 175-201.
48. See Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968);
49. Susan Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1993);
50. and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
51. See David C. Kang, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (New York: Cambridge university Press, 2002). He compares South Korea and the Philippines and shows that although both countries have serious corruption, the reason that South Korea developed better than the Philippines economically is that the power of business groups and the government remained balanced for quite a long time, which determined the effects of corruption.
52. Sun Tianqi and Liu Wei, "Gaige Kaifang Yilai Woguo Geshengfen Jumin Shouru he Xiaofei Shuiping Bianhua de Yige Bijiao Fenxi" [A comparative study of residents' income and consumption changes across provinces since the economic reform and open-door policy], Jinrong Yanjiu [Finance Studies], cited in Lu, Duan, and Wu, "Chaijie Heilongjiang Maiguanlian," p. 34.
53. Lu, Duan, and Wu, "Chaijie Heilongjiang Maiguanlian," p. 34.
54. "Maiguan Shuji Yingzao Fubai Shengtai" [Office-selling Party secretary created corruption-environment], Minzhu Yu Fazhi Shibao [Democracy and Rule by Law Times] (Shanghai), October 31, 2006, in Renmin Wang, .
55. For example, see Pierre F. Landry, "Performance, Markets, and the Political Fate ot Chinese Mayors," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association (APSA), Boston, Mass., September 2002. He did an empirical study to test whether economic performances influence the promotion chances of mayors in China. He shows that although mayors are pressured to fulfill economic targets, their performances do not influence their political fate as much as people usually predict.
56. See also Victor Shih, "Factions Matter: Personal Networks and the Distribution of Bank Loans in China," Journal of Contemporary China 13:38 (February 2004), pp. 3-19. He gave a review of factional debates among China scholars, who commonly agree that personal connections and factions matter for a Chinese official. Shih also tried to track factions and used empirical studies to test how factions matter.
57. Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg, Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and Processes (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 156.
58. Shih, "Factions Matter," p. 7.
59. "Shanxi Yuan Shengwei Fushuji Hou Wujie Bei Shuangkai; Jianfang Yi Li'an Diaocha" [Former vice-Party secretary of Shanxi Province Hou Wujie was expelled from the party and his public position; the Procuratorate has started the investigation], Xinhua Wang, October 20, 2005, .
60. Paoguan Yaoguan de Buneng Tiba Zhongyong" [The cadres asking for positions should not be promoted and set important positions], Xinhua She, in Gaoceng Dongtai [Dynamics of the senior officials]. Renmin Wang, February 13, 2006, .
61. Feng Yuguo, "Tuji Tiaozheng Ganbu de Zhidu Jingjixue Fenxi" [The institutional economic analysis of cadre reshuffling in a short time], Shanghai Zhengquan Bao [Shanghai Stock Post], in Pinglun Guancha [Review and Observation], Renmin Wang, February 13, 2006, .