The internal organization of government

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 46, Issue 1, 1994, Pages 1-29

  Tirole, Jean ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70349684224     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a042114     Document Type: Article

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