Game-theoretic model for collaborative protocols in selfish, tariff-free, multihop wireless networks

Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 762-770

  Ng, See Kee ^a   Seah, Winston K G ^b  

^a NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^b INSTITUTE FOR INFOCOMM RESEARCH   (Singapore)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AD HOC NETWORKS; BROADCASTING; COMMUNICATION; COMPETITION; CRYPTOGRAPHY; DECISION MAKING; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; HELIUM; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INFORMATION THEORY; LOCAL AREA NETWORKS; SENSOR NETWORKS; WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS (WLAN); WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS; WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS;

COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS; INFOCOM; MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS;

WIRELESS NETWORKS;

EID: 51349094817     PISSN: 0743166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/INFOCOM.2007.52     Document Type: Conference Paper

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