Getting the ball rolling: Voluntary contributions to a large-scale public project

Journal of Public Economic Theory

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 503-528

  Yildirim, Huseyin ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51249113577     PISSN: 10973923     EISSN: 14679779     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00275.x     Document Type: Article

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