Risk externalities and the problem of wildfire risk

Journal of Urban Economics

Volumn 64, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 488-495

  Shafran, Aric P ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA POLYTECHNIC STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Externalities; Risk mitigation; Spatial interactions; Wildfire; Wildland urban interface

Indexed keywords

EID: 51249108872     PISSN: 00941190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jue.2008.05.001     Document Type: Article

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