The impact of financial incentives on physician productivity in medical groups

Health Services Research

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 885-906

  Conrad, Douglas A ^a   Sales, Anne ^b   Liang, Su Ying ^b   Chaudhuri, Anoshua ^b   Maynard, Charles ^b   Pieper, Lisa ^b   Weinstein, Laurel ^b   Gans, David ^b   Piland, Neill ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Compensation; Financial incentives; Managed care; Physician productivity

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; GROUP PRACTICE; HUMAN; MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION; MONEY; MOTIVATION; PHYSICIAN INCOME; PRODUCTIVITY; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDIES; DATA COLLECTION; EFFICIENCY; FEES AND CHARGES; FEMALE; GROUP PRACTICE; HUMANS; LEAST-SQUARES ANALYSIS; MALE; MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS; MOTIVATION; PHYSICIAN INCENTIVE PLANS; PHYSICIANS; PHYSICIANS, WOMEN; SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS; SEX FACTORS; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0036706168     PISSN: 00179124     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1034/j.1600-0560.2002.57.x     Document Type: Article

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