Optimal contracts under adverse selection and moral hazard: A continuous-time approach

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 1021-1073

  Sung, Jaeyoung ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 24044507942     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhi020     Document Type: Review

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