Fundamental tradeoffs and constrained coalitional games in autonomic wireless networks

Proceedings of the 5th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad Hoc, and Wireless Networks, WiOpt 2007

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages

  Jiang, Tao ^a   Baras, John S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AD HOC NETWORKS; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS; ENERGY POLICY; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION;

AUTONOMIC NETWORKS; COALITIONAL GAMES; DYNAMIC GAMES; ENERGY CONSUMPTION; INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM; KEY PROBLEMS; NETWORK FORMATIONS;

WIRELESS NETWORKS;

EID: 49649118633     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/WIOPT.2007.4480056     Document Type: Conference Paper

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