In defense of boards

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 17, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 667-682

  Dominguez Martinez, Silvia ^a   Swank, Otto H ^b   Visser, Bauke ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 49549102442     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: 15309134     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00190.x     Document Type: Article

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