On specifying truth-conditions

Philosophical Review

Volumn 117, Issue 3, 2008, Pages 385-443

  Rayo, Agustín ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 49249121573     PISSN: 00318108     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2008-003     Document Type: Article

References (38)

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