Fool the markets? creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia

Scottish Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 55, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 465-487

  Bernoth, Kerstin ^a   Wolff, Guntram B ^b  

^a DE NEDERLANDSCHE BANK   (Netherlands)

^b Deutsche Bundesbank ^*  (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Creative accounting; Government bond yields; Risk premia; Stock flow

Indexed keywords

EUROPEAN UNION; FINANCIAL MARKET; FISCAL POLICY; GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST; INTEREST RATE; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; STOCK MARKET;

EID: 48649103289     PISSN: 00369292     EISSN: 14679485     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2008.00462.x     Document Type: Article

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