Position-specific information in social networks: Are you connected?

Mathematical social sciences

Volumn 56, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 283-295

  McBride, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Communication; Connections; Limited horizons; Observation

Indexed keywords

EID: 48449095990     PISSN: 01654896     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.003     Document Type: Article

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