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Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 184-203

On non-nash equilibria

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EID: 0347803074     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0664     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (19)

References (22)
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    • Lehrer E. Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games With Semi-Standard Information. Int. J. Game Theory. 19:1990;191-217.
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.