Neoliberal law: Unintended consequences of market-friendly law reforms

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 29, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1087-1099

  Glinavos, Ioannis ^a  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNISM; DEVELOPING WORLD; ECONOMIC THEORY; NEOLIBERALISM; POLICY REFORM; PROPERTY RIGHTS; WORLD BANK;

EID: 48049109147     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436590802201055     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. See K Dam, The Law-Development Nexus, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006 for an illustration of the common connection of law reform based on property and contract to economic development.
2. Chang Ha-Joon, 'Breaking the mould: An institutionalist political economy alternative to the neoliberal theory of the market and the state', Cambridge Journal of Economics, 26, 2002, p 540.
3. See J Stiglitz, The Roaring Nineties, London: Penguin, 2004, ch 9.
4. and Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents, London: Penguin, 2003, ch 2.
5. K Rittich, 'The future of law and development: Second generation reforms and the incorporation of the social', Michigan Journal of International Law, 26, 2004, p 210.
6. Ibid, p 216.
7. K Davies, 'What can the rule of law variable tell us about rule of law reforms?', Journal of International Law, 26, 2005, p 144.
8. R Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Study, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997.
9. and D Kaufmann, A Kraay & P Zoido-Lobatón, Governance Matters, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2196, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999.
10. C Clague, P Keefer, S Knack & M Olson, 'Institutions and economic performance: Property rights and contract enforcement', in Clague (ed), Institutions and Economic Development: Growth and Governance in Less Developed and Post Socialist Countries, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp 67-90.
11. P Mahoney, 'The common law and economic growth: Hayek might be right', Journal of Legal Studies, 30, 2001, p 503.
12. A Brunetti, G Kisunko & B Weder, 'Credibility of rules and economic growth: Evidence from a worldwide survey of the private sector', World Bank Economic Review, 12, 1998, p 353.
13. See JE Campos, D Lien & S Pradhan, 'The impact of corruption on investment: Predictability matters', World Development, 27, 1999, p 1059.
14. P Mauro, 'The effects of corruption on growth, investment and government expenditure', in KA Elliott (ed), Corruption and the Global Economy Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997, p 83.
15. P Mauro, 'Corruption and growth', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1995, p 681.
16. and Shang-Jin Wei, 'How taxing is corruption on international investors?', Review of Economics & Statistics, 82, 2000, p 1.
17. On Supreme Court independence, see Lars P Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators, CESIFO Working Paper No 906, 2003, Munich: CESIFO.
18. http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1993/ north-autobio.html.
19. Davies, 'What can the rule of law variable tell us about rule of law reforms?', p 146.
20. K Davis & M Trebilcock, 'Legal reforms and development', Third World Quarterly, 22 (1), 2001, p 27.
21. See, for example, J Stiglitz, 'Towards a new paradigm for development: strategies, policies and processes', Plebisch Lecture, 19 October 1998, at www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/prebisch98.pdf.
22. and Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work, London: Penguin, 2007.
23. See, for example, World Bank, World Development Report, 1997: The State in a Changing World, Washington, DC: 1997.
24. World Bank, World Development Report, 2005: Verifying Rights to Land and Other Property, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005.
25. and World Bank, World Development Report, 2006: Equity and Development, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006.
26. S Soederberg, 'The emperor's new suit: The new international financial architecture as a reinvention of the Washington Consensus', Global Governance, 7 2001, p 460.
27. A Anghie, 'Time present and time past: Globalization, IFIs and the Third World', New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 32, 1999-2000, p 254.
28. One need not look further than Russia to see the truth of this claim. See also Ziya Önis & Fikret Senses, 'Rethinking the emerging Post-Washington Consensus', Development and Change, 36 (2), 2005, p 8.
29. M Pastor & C Wise, 'The politics of second generation reform', Journal of Democracy, 10 (3), 1999, pp 34-48.
30. RL Hale 'Coercion and distribution in a supposedly non-coercive state', Political Science Quarterly, 38, 1923, p 470.
31. P Ireland, 'Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory', Legal Studies, 23, 2003, p 489.
32. Rittich, 'The future of law and development', p 234.
33. Soederberg, 'The emperor's new suit', p 460.
34. Rittich, 'The future of law and development', p 216.
35. See T Teivanen, Enter Economism - Exit Politics, London: Zed Books, 2002.
36. U Mattei, 'A theory of imperial law: A study on US hegemony and the Latin resistance', Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10, 2003, p 383.
37. RL Hale, 'Law making by uno.cial minorities', Columbia Law Review, 20, 1920, p 603.
38. Ireland, 'Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory', p 491.
39. A De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol I, 1835, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
40. Mattei, 'A theory of imperial law', p 402.
41. LR Boetsch, 'Neoliberal limits to democracy: A theoretical exploration', 2005, at http://web.pdx.edu/~leopoldo/neolibdem.pdf.
42. William Easterly, review of The End of Poverty, Washington Post, 10 March 2005, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A25562-2005Mar10.html.
43. See J Hackney, 'Law and neoclassical economics theory: A critical history of the distribution/effciency debate', Journal of Socio-Economics, 32, 2003, pp 361-390.