The emperor's new suit: The new international financial architecture as a reinvention of the Washington consensus

Global Governance

Volumn 7, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 453-467

  Soederberg, Susanne ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0035539988     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00704009     Document Type: Review

References (41)

1. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (New York: Rinehard, 1944).
2. Eric Helleiner, "Explaining the Globalization of Financial Markets: Bringing the States Back In," Review of International Political Economy 2, no. 2 (spring 1995): 323.
3. K. Nordhaug, "The Political Economy of the Dollar and the Yen in East Asia" (mimeo, Department of Geography and International Development Studies, University of Roskilde, Denmark, 2001), p. 2.
4. Elsewhere I discuss this changing nature of U.S. structural power as "imposed leadership." See S. Soederberg, "The New International Financial Architecture: Imposed Leadership and Emerging Markets," in L. Panitch and C. Leys, eds., Socialist Register: A World of Contradictions (London: Merlin Press, in press).
5. For more policy oriented discussion of the Washington Consensus, see John Williamson, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
6. "Unraveling the Washington Consensus: An Interview with Joseph Stiglitz," Multinational Monitor 21, no. 4 (2000).
7. International Monetary Fund, "IMF Builds on Initiatives to Meet Challenges of Globalization," in IMF Survey (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997), p. 8.
8. Benjamin Cohen, "Capital Controls: The Neglected Option," in Geoffrey R. D. Underhill, ed., What Is to Be Done? Global Economic Disorder and Policies for a New International Financial Architecture (in press), p. 4.
9. To ensure uniformity, SAPs were implemented in a "one-size-fits-all" manner. Some of the SAPs' neoliberal-inspired reforms include trade liberalization, liberalization of price controls, privatization of public enterprises, limits on money and credit growth, and so forth.
10. Manuel Guitián, "Reality and the Logic of Capital Flow Liberalization," in Christine P. Ries and Richard J. Sweeney, eds., Capital Controls in Emerging Economies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 22.
11. Peter Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: Verso, 1999), p. 25ff.
12. "US Net Foreign Debt Increased 67.5 Percent in 2000," Asian Wall Street Journal, 29 June-1 July 2001.
13. This, of course, is attributable to the practice of using the dollar as an intermediate currency; on this, see Doug Henwood, Wall Street: How It Works and for Whom (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 41-55.
14. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001 : Attacking Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 3.
15. The vote surrounding the release of this huge sum of money played a major role in setting up the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (IFIAC) and in the subsequent publication of the Meltzer Commission Report, which was released in March 2000.
16. This has been well chronicled by many authors across the political spectrum. See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs, "The IMF and the Asian Flu," The American Prospect, no. 37 (March-April 1998), at http://epn.org/prospect/37/ 37sachf.html, pp. 16-21; Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex," New Left Review 228 (1998): 3-24; Walden Bello, "East Asia: On the Eve of the Great Transformation?" Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 3 (1998): 424-444.
17. This has been well chronicled by many authors across the political spectrum. See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs, "The IMF and the Asian Flu," The American Prospect, no. 37 (March-April 1998), at http://epn.org/prospect/37/ 37sachf.html, pp. 16-21; Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex," New Left Review 228 (1998): 3-24; Walden Bello, "East Asia: On the Eve of the Great Transformation?" Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 3 (1998): 424-444.
18. This has been well chronicled by many authors across the political spectrum. See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs, "The IMF and the Asian Flu," The American Prospect, no. 37 (March-April 1998), at http://epn.org/prospect/37/ 37sachf.html, pp. 16-21; Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex," New Left Review 228 (1998): 3-24; Walden Bello, "East Asia: On the Eve of the Great Transformation?" Review of International Political Economy 5, no. 3 (1998): 424-444.
19. Helge Hveem, "The Washington Consensus vs. the East Asian Model?" Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies, no. 2 (1998), at http://130.225.203.37/ articles/issues/1998/2/The_Washington_Consensus.
20. Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Capital Myth: The Differences Between Trade in Widgets and Dollars," Foreign Affairs (May-June 1998).
21. James Tobin, "A Proposal for International Monetary Reform," Eastern Economic Journal 4, nos. 3-4 (1978): 153-159.
22. Many countries already have some form of domestic financial transaction tax - for example, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom. Basically this tax operates like the Tobin tax but is implied to the domestic as opposed to the international economy.
23. Philip Arestis and Malcolm Sawyer, "What Role for the Tobin Tax in World Economic Governance?" in Jonathan Michie and John Grueve Smith, eds., Global Instability: The Political Economy of World Economic Governance (London: Routledge, 1999).
24. Moises Naim, "Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion?" paper prepared for the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, Washington, D.C., 1999.
25. Robert Wade, "The Coming Fight over Capital Flows," Foreign Policy (winter 1998-1999): 42.
26. Recently, the former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz, as well as officials of the IMF, such as deputy managing director Stanley Fischer, have championed the use of particularized, or country-level, capital controls in select emerging market economies.
27. John Williamson, "Orthodoxy Is Right: Liberalize the Capital Account Last," in Christine P. Ries and Richard J. Sweeney, eds., Capital Controls in Emerging Economies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 13-16.
28. IMF, "Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF," in IMF Survey (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1997).
29. Donald J. Mathieson and Garry J. Schinasi, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, Parts 1-7 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, September 2000), especially sections 1-7; IMF, "Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy," Occasional Paper No. 193, Washington, D.C., 10 August 2000, chap. 3.
30. Donald J. Mathieson and Garry J. Schinasi, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, Parts 1-7 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, September 2000), especially sections 1-7; IMF, "Exchange Rate Regimes in an Increasingly Integrated World Economy," Occasional Paper No. 193, Washington, D.C., 10 August 2000, chap. 3.
31. See IMF, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2000); IMF, Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, Occassional Paper No. 190, Washington, D.C., 2000, parts 1-3.
32. See IMF, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2000); IMF, Capital Controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization, Occassional Paper No. 190, Washington, D.C., 2000, parts 1-3.
33. John Kirton, What Is the G-20? at www.g7.utoronto.ca.
34. Asian countries always had a high rate of savings vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Malaysia and Singapore had rates hovering around 45 percent of their respective GDP levels, while savings levels in Hong Kong registered at about 30 percent of the GDP and Japan at 27 percent (Taipei Times, 9 July 2000).
35. Robert Wade and Frank Veneroso, "The Asian Crisis: The High Debt Model Versus the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF Complex," New Left Review 228 (March-April 1998): 22.
36. John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
37. See "In Praise of Rules," The Economist, 7 April 2001.
38. Ilene Grabel, "Marketing the Third World: The Contradictions of Portfolio Investment in the Global Economy," World Development 24, no. 11 (1996): 1763.
39. Mary Ann Haley, "Emerging Market Makers: The Power of Institutional Investors," in Leslie Elliot Armijo, ed., Financial Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 75.
40. Robert Cox, Power, Production, and Social Forces: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
41. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 3.