A model of the operation and development of a National Oil Company

Energy Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 2459-2485

  Hartley, Peter ^a   Medlock III, Kenneth B ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Government ownership; Intertemporal optimization; National Oil Company; Resource extraction

Indexed keywords

BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS; ELECTRIC NETWORK TOPOLOGY; EMPLOYMENT; PETROLEUM ENGINEERING;

(+ MOD 2N) OPERATION; (OTDR) TECHNOLOGY; CASH FLOWS; CONSUMER SURPLUS (CS); DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES; ELSEVIER (CO); NATIONAL OIL COMPANY (NOC); OBJECTIVE FUNCTION (OF); WIDER RANGE;

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS;

EMPLOYMENT GENERATION; EXPLOITATION; EXTRACTION METHOD; OIL INDUSTRY; OIL PRODUCTION; OIL SUPPLY; OPTIMIZATION; PROFITABILITY;

EID: 48049084726     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2007.12.017     Document Type: Article

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