Closing time: Assessing the Iranian threat to the Strait of Hormuz

International Security

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 82-117

  Talmadge, Caitlin ^a,b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b Security Studies Program   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47949111227     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2008.33.1.82     Document Type: Article

References (156)

1. See John Deutch and James R. Schlesinger, National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency, Independent Task Force Report, No. 58 (Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006), pp. 23, 68;
2. and Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Paul Elrick, Theodore Karasik, Robert Klein, Sherril Lingel, Brian Nichiporuk, Robert Uy, and John Zavadil, Assuring Access in Key Strategic Regions: Toward a Long-Term Strategy (Santa Monica, Calif.: Arroyo Center, RAND, 2004), p. xvii.
3. In 2006 approximately 17 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil transited the Strait of Hormuz. There is only one pipeline alternative, which runs east to west across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Its capacity is only about 5 million bbl/d, and about a quarter of that is in use, leaving slightly fewer than 4 million bbl/d of slack-hardly enough to compensate for closure of the strait. The United Arab Emirates is planning to build a pipeline carrying its oil to a port in the Gulf of Oman, but this pipeline would carry only 1.5 million bbl/d. Other Persian Gulf countries periodically express interest in building a larger 5 million bbl/d pipeline that would enable them to bypass the strait and offload oil at Oman. Details on its potential route remain unresolved, and building it would take more than a decade. Plans for such pipelines have fallen through in the past. "Gulf Governments Plan Oil Pipelines That Could Lessen Possible Iranian Threats," Associated Press Financial Wire, March 20, 2007;
4. "News in Brief," Petroleum Economist, December 1, 2006, p. 40; and Energy Information Administration, "Persian Gulf Region," Country Analysis Briefs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy, June 2007), http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html.
5. Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum (London: LB. Tauris, 2004), pp. 305-306.
6. On the economic impact of oil prices, see James D. Hamilton, "Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 228-248;
7. and Donald W. Jones, Paul N. Leiby, and Inja K. Paik, "Oil Price Shocks and the Macroeconomy: What Has Been Learned since 1996," Energy Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 1-32.
8. One exception is Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz," CSIS Brief (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 26, 2007), pp. 1-7.
9. For the former, see Simon Jenkins, "If This Is Ahmadinejad's Bluff, It Is Bluff Worth Calling," Guardian, May 10, 2006;
10. and James Jay Carafano, William W Beach, Ariel Cohen, Lisa Curtis, Tracy L. Foertsch, Alison A. Fraser, Ben Lieberman, and James Phillips, "If Iran Provokes an Energy Crisis: Modeling the Problem in a War Game," Center for Data Analysis Report, No. 07-03 (July 25, 2007), http://www.heritage.org/ Research/EnergyandEnvironment/cda07-03.cfm.
11. For the latter, see Dennis Blair and Kenneth Lieberthal, "Smooth Sailing: The World's Shipping Lanes Are Safe," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 3 (May/June 2007), pp. 7-13.
12. Simon Henderson, "Facing Iran's Challenge: Safeguarding Oil Exports from the Persian Gulf," PolicyWatch, No. 1112 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 7, 2006), http://www. washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID?2477.
13. Joris Janssen Lok, "Western Navies Eye New Tech to Defeat Mines," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 27, 2007, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel?dti&id? news/dtMINE0407.xml&headline? Western%20Navies%20Eye%20New%20Tech%20to%20Defeat%20Mines.
14. Anthony H. Cordesman and Martin Kleiber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities: The Threat in the Northern Gulf (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press, 2007), p. 201.
15. Vice Adm. Lowell E. Jacoby, "Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States," testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 109th Cong., 1st sess., February 16, 2005, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/317.pdf.
16. Martin S. Navias and E.R. Hooton, Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Crisis, 1980-1988 (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 86.
17. Ibid.
18. On U.S. promises, see David E. Sanger, "On Carrier in Gulf, Cheney Warns Iran," New York Times, May 11, 2007.
19. Information taken from IRAN 2004, road map of Iran by Gitashenasi Geographical and Cartographic Institute, available from author; Google Earth; Michael Eisenstadt, "Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions," Policy Paper, No. 42 (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), pp. 61-62;
20. and "Southwest Asia I: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia," edition C, Interschool Subcourse IS 3008 (Fort Huachuca, Ariz.: U.S. Army Intelligence Center, March 1999), http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ library/policy/army/accp/is3008/index.html.
21. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IBS), "The Middle East and North Africa," The Military Balance, 2008 (London: IISS, 2008), p. 243.
22. Information on base names and which organization controls them is from ibid; physical location of bases is from IRAN 2004; and measurements and other observations are taken from Google Earth.
23. Navias and Hooton, Tanker Wars, pp. 37-38, 58, 81, 109-112, 122-123, 174.
24. Seymour M. Hersh, "The Iran Plans," New Yorker, April 17, 2006, p. 30.
25. The feasibility of an Israeli attack of this type is discussed in Whitney Raas and Austin Long, "Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities," International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 7-33.
26. National Intelligence Council, "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," National Intelligence Estimate, November 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf; and Rory McCarthy, "Unilateral Military Strike Still an Option, Senior Ministers Insist," Guardian, December 8, 2007.
27. Norman Podhoretz, "The Case for Bombing Iran," Commentary, Vol. 123, No. 6 (June 2007), pp. 17-23.
28. Quoted in Ali Akbar Dareini, "Ayatollah Warns West against Action," Associated Press, June 5, 2006.
29. Quoted in Ariel Cohen, James Phillips, and William Schirano, "Countering Iran's Oil Weapon," Backgrounder, No. 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, November 13, 2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ Iran/bg1982.cfm#_ftnref4.
30. James A. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns: An Historical Analysis of the Decisions of the Commanders," Naval War College Review, Vol. 19, No. 10 (June 1967), p. 78.
31. Ibid, p. 81; and Michael E. Golda, "The Dardanelles Campaign: A Historical Analogy for Littoral Mine Warfare," Naval War College Review, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1998), pp. 82-96.
32. IISS, The Military Balance, 2008, pp. 242-244.
33. Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, pp. 119-120.
34. IISS, The Military Balance, 2008, pp. 242-244.
35. Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, 2006-2007, 18th ed. (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2006), p. 11.
36. Jane's Fighting Ships, 2006-2007 (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2006), p. 355.
37. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities (London: Sampson Low, Marsten, May 2005), pp. 62-63.
38. Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 355.
39. This is the figure reported in most sources. Jane's Fighting Ships claims that Iran may have "up to 3,000 mines." Ibid., p. 354.
40. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns," p. 91.
41. Tamara Moser Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes": A Short History of U.S. Naval Mine Countermeasures, 1777-1991 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1991) p. 101.
42. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown, 1995).
43. Meacham, "Four Mining Campaigns," p. 105.
44. Ibid., p. 113.
45. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, chap. 4.
46. Ibid.; and Jane's Undenvater Warfare Systems, p. 365.
47. For background on mines, see Thomas R. Bernitt and Sam J. Tangredi, "Mine Warfare and Globalization: Low-Tech Warfare in a High-Tech World," in Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 391-397;
48. and Gary K. Hartmann, Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979).
49. Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," p. 126.
50. Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, pp. 362-364.
51. Iran also possesses an unknown quantity of the M-26 moored contact mine and the smaller MYaM moored contact mine. Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, pp. 362, 364;
52. and Eisenstadt, "Iranian Military Power," p. 55. Reports persist that Iran has tried to acquire or indigenously produce the EM-52 or MN-52 rocket-propelled mine as well.
53. The MDM-1, a slight variant of the MDM-6, is also a possible candidate. Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, p. 364.
54. IISS, The Military Balance, 2008, pp. 242-244;
55. and Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, chap. 4.
56. Navias and Hooton, Tanker Wars, pp. 3, 4, 96-98, 127-128, 181-183.
57. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War: Vol. 2, The Iran-Iraq War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990), p. 558;
58. and Capt. John Moore, "The Gulf: Hazardous but Still Navigable," Jane's Naval Review, Vol. 4 (1985), p. 53. Both simply assert the 2,000 to 3,000 figure without explaining why it should be accepted.
59. Michael A. Glosny, "Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan," International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 143-145.
60. The Wonsan calculation appears in ibid. The Red Sea figure appears in Cordesman and Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, p. 565.
61. It is unclear what happened to the remainder of the Iraqi mines. Navias and Hooton, Tanker Wars, pp. 196-197.
62. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, p. 444.
63. Jane's Fighting Ships, pp. 890, 902-903.
64. Paul J. Ryan, "Iraqi Freedom: Mine Countermeasures a Success," Proceedings, Vol. 129, No. 5 (May 2003), p. 52.
65. Cmdr. Michael P. Tillotson, "CTF 56: Operation Iraqi Freedom," PowerPoint presentation, plenary session, Sixth International Symposium on Technology and the Mine Problem, Naval Post-graduate School, Monterey, California, April 21-23, 2004, available on CD-ROM from author.
66. Ryan, "Iraqi Freedom," p. 52.
67. Tillotson, "CTF 56."
68. Additional MCM vessels from the United States would take weeks to reach the Persian Gulf from their home ports. Committee for Mine Warfare Assessment, Naval Studies Board, and Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, National Research Council, Naval Mine Warfare: Operational and Technical Challenges for Naval Forces (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2001), p. 44;
69. "Navy Acquisitions: Improved Littoral War-Fighting Capabilities Needed," Report to Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Military Research and Development, Armed Services Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, GAO-01-493 (Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, May 2001), p. 6;
70. and Frank Colucci, "Navy Upgrading Sea-Mine Sweeper Helicopters," National Defense, Vol. 88, No. 602 (January 2004), pp. 38-39.
71. Naval Mine Warfare, pp. 82-85;
72. Thorn Shanker, "U.S. and Britain to Add Ships to Persian Gulf in Signal to Iran," New York Times, December 21, 2006;
73. GlobalSecurity.org, "Airborne Mine Counter-measures (AMCM)," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/ amcm.htm;
74. and Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, 2006-2007, p. 531.
75. Robert J. Natter, "Access Is Not Assured," Proceedings, Vol. 129, No. 1 (January 2003), p. 39.
76. Continuous shore-based surveillance of the Iranians was common during the tanker wars. Moore, "The Gulf," pp. 53-54.
77. Jane's Underwater Warfare Systems, 2006-2007, pp. 431, 445.
78. Melia, "Damn the Torpedoes," p. 126.
79. Craig L. Symonds, Decision at Sea: Five Naval Battles That Shaped American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pt. 5.
80. Thom Shanker, "Iran Encounter Grimly Echoes '02 War Game," New York Times, January 12, 2008.
81. Owen L. Sirrs, "Operational Art Can Neutralize the Asymmetric Small Boat Threat in Major Operations," paper submitted to the Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, February 2, 2002), pp. 8, 15, http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?&verb? getRecord&metadataPrefix?html&identifier?ADA401088.
82. Mark Logico, "U.S. Navy Ships Conduct FAC/FIAC Exercises," press release, No. 128-07, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. Fifth Fleet, June 6, 2007, http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/articles/2007/128.html.
83. Jane's Fighting Ships, pp. 887, 890.
84. Shlomo Brom and Yiftah Shapir, The Middle East Military Balance, 2001-2002 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), p. 160.
85. China itself has an improved version of this missile, the C-802A, with a range extended to 180 kilometers. It is reasonable to think that Iran possesses or could acquire the C-802A. Robert Hewson, "Dragon's Teeth: Chinese Missiles Raise Their Game," Jane's Navy International, Vol. 112, No. 1 (January 1, 2007), pp. 19-23.
86. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 56.
87. IISS, The Military Balance, 2008, pp. 242-244; and Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 357.
88. Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 354.
89. Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 117.
90. Jane's Sentinel: The Gulf States (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1997), sec. 2.13.5.
91. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, pp. 117-118.
92. Jane's Sentinel, sec. 2.13.5;
93. and Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 56.
94. Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 354.
95. "Dragon's Teeth"; and Jane's Navy International.
96. E.R. Hooton, ed., Jane's Naval Weapon Systems, No. 45 (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, April 2005), pp. 286-291.
97. On over-the-horizon targeting, see Norman Friedman, Seapower and Space: From the Dawn of the Missile Age to Net-Centric Warfare (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 7-8.
98. Radar horizons are calculated from the equations provided in the online version of George W. Stimson, Introduction to Airborne Radar, 2d ed. (Mendham, N.J.: SciTech, 1998), http://radarproblems.com/calculators/horizon. htm.
99. Still, atmospheric conditions in the gulf, including high levels of dust and humidity, seem to cause radio waves to behave unpredictably. Those with operational experience in the region report that on some days lines of sight are greatly restricted, whereas on other days a phenomenon known as "ducting" greatly extends the range of radio waves beyond what normal LOS calculations would predict.
100. Alon Ben-David, "Hizbullah Hits Israeli Corvette," Jane's Defense Weekly, July 26,2006, p. 18.
101. Yaakov Katz and Sam Ser, "IDF Report Card," Jerusalem. Post, August 25, 2006.
102. Yaakov Katz, "50 Miles from Beirut 'We Are in Charge of the Sea,'" Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2006.
103. Cordesman and Kleiber, Iran's Military Forces and Warfighting Capabilities, p. 117.
104. These measurements were derived using ArcView software to combine and manipulate Russian maps taken from Global Planner: International Datasets (Dallas, Tex.: Tobin International, 2004);
105. and a map of the Hormuz shipping lanes from the University of Texas library, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/hormuz_80.jpg. The map created shows how far inland Iranian launchers could be while still potentially targeting traffic in the strait - but not how far out into the Persian Gulf such missiles potentially could travel. Map available from the author.
106. This challenge becomes harder for the United States if Iran has longer-range missiles, which would expand the search area. It becomes easier if alternate shipping routes are available farther from the Iranian shore. Bathymetry charts reveal that the water may be deep enough to accommo-date large vessels south of the official shipping lanes. Still, if U.S. MCM vessels were operating to clear the shipping lanes, they would remain vulnerable to Iranian fire. The bathymetry can be examined using a map from the University of Texas library, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran- strait_of_hormuz_2004.jpg.
107. Iraq launched an average of 14.7 Scuds per week during Desert Storm. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993), p. 83.
108. This topographic map was created using ArcView software to combine and manipulate the Russian maps, the University of Texas shipping lanes map, and topographic data from the GTOPO30 series produced by the U.S. Geological Survey. Map available from the author.
109. If one averages the heights of four potential targets - a U.S. MCM ship, a U.S. frigate, an Aegis cruiser, and an Aegis destroyer - it is possible to generate a rough estimate of how close an Iranian shooter at a particular height would have to be to reach these targets. On average, a shooter at a height of 0 meters would have to be within 16 kilometers to conduct LOS targeting; at 125 meters, within 62 kilometers; at 250 meters, within 81 kilometers; at 500 meters, within 108 kilometers; and at 1,000 meters, within 147 kilometers. Ship heights taken from the entry on the U.S. Navy in Jane's Fighting Ships.
110. IRAN 2004.
111. The United States eventually might be able to link three or more platforms (some combination of tactical aircraft, Rivet Joint, JSTARS, AWACS, Global Hawk, and others) to triangulate the location of ground radars using three or more different sensors and time delay of arrival techniques. This approach would cut the time needed to locate such targets. David A. Fulghum, "Taming Air-borne Networks," Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 163, No. 7 (August 15, 2005), p. 46;
112. and "Mistaken Identity?" Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 160, No. 27 (July 5, 2004), p. 19.
113. Jane's Space Directory (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2006-07), p. 604;
114. and Louis J. Rodrigues, "Defense Support Program: Ground Station Upgrades Not Based on Validated Requirements," GAO/NSIAD-93-148 (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, May 1993).
115. Jane's Space Directory, p. 605. Recently declassified documents reveal that DSP satellites have proven their ability to detect and characterize events other than ballistic missile launches. During the Cold War they also detected pipeline fires, surface-to-air missile launches, aircraft crashes, and the afterburners on Soviet Backfire bombers. This sort of capability will only improve as the United States completes the transition to its new Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) of satellites.
116. See the following documents available in Jeffrey Richelson, ed., "Space-Based Early Warning: From MIDAS to DPS to SBIRS," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 235, November 9, 2007, http://www.gwu.edu/?nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB235/index.htm;
117. Air Force Space Command, SBIRS Overview Brief, Combat Air Force Commander's Conference, November 16-17, 1998, pp. 3, 7;
118. memo from William G. Hyland to Helmut Sonnenfeldt, December 13, 1975; and Ellis E. Lapin, "Surveillance by Satellite," Journal of Defense Research, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 169-186.
119. See also Friedman, Seapower and Space, chap. 10.
120. Jane's Space Directory, pp. 604-605;
121. and Friedman, Seapower and Space, p. 358 n. 15.
122. Jane's Space Directory, p. 605.
123. Friedman, Seapower and Space, p. 358 n. 18.
124. Jane's C4I Systems, 2006-07 (Alexandria, Va.: Jane's Information Group, 2006), p. 318;
125. Jane's Fighting Ships, p. 877;
126. and Friedman, Seapower and Space, p. 244.
127. This concept of operations comes from Alan Vick, Richard Moore, Bruce Pirnie, and John Stillion, Aerospace Operations against Elusive Ground Targets (Arlington, Va.: RAND, 2001), pp. 65-66.
128. These assumptions are favorable to the Iranians. If they take even one extra minute to move the TEL, the patrol radius of each orbiting aircraft is increased to 48.9 kilometers, yielding a much larger single aircraft coverage area of 7,512 square kilometers, and necessitating only 3 orbits.
129. See the entry on the U.S. Navy in Jane's Fighting Ships.
130. This estimate comes from the assumption of 25 Sardine/Saccade batteries plus 12 Silkworm/Seersucker batteries, which would make for 37 batteries. I rounded down to 36 batteries to make an even number and easier calculations.
131. Naval Mine Warfare, pp. 49-50.
132. Hooton, Jane's Naval Weapon Systems, pp. 237-238.
133. Jane's Fighting Ships, pp. 877, 880. Aegis and other ships will soon carry shorter-range radar-guided missiles known as the RIM-7 Evolved Sea Sparrow that might be able to provide more effective defense in the narrow engagement distances of the strait. FAS Military Analysis Network, "RIM-7 Sea Sparrow Missile," updated November 26, 1999, http://www.fas.org/man/ dod-101/sys/missile/rim-7.htm.
134. Raas and Long, "Osirak Redux?"
135. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 69;
136. IISS, The Military Balance, 2008, pp. 242-244;
137. and Sharon Theimer, "Pentagon's Doorstep Surprise," Houston Chronicle, January 17, 2007. Some unconfirmed reports indicate that Russia has sold Iran 250 Su-30 fighter bombers, which would represent a substantial capabilities improvement. These reports originated in the Israeli media. "Russia's Largest Arms Deal in 30 Years: Iran Buys 250 Fighter-Bombers, " DEBKA report, July 27, 2007, http://patdollard.com/2007/07/russias- largest-arms-deal-in-30-years-iran-buys-250-fighter-bombers/. For a skeptical perspective
138. see "Russia Denies Plans to Supply 250 Su-30 Fighter Planes to Iran," BBC Monitoring, August 2, 2007.
139. Extensive and realistic training greatly improves the combat performance of fighter pilots. See Marshall L. Michel, Clashes: Air Combat over Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997).
140. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, chap. 5.
141. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, p. 58.
142. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 71.
143. Yaakov Katz and Herb Keinon, "Israel Warns of Repercussions from Russian Missile Sales to Iran," Jerusalem Post, January 17, 2007.
144. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 72.
145. Raas and Long, "Osirak Redux?" pp. 16-17.
146. Jane's Land-Based Air Defense, 2006-2007 (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2006), pp. 128-131, 152, 320, 337;
147. and Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 72.
148. Entries on Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Serbia in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ factbook/index.html.
149. See Iran entry in ibid.
150. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, p. 72.
151. Uzi Mahnaimi and Sarah Baxter, "Focus: Mission Iran," Sunday Times, January 7, 2007;
152. and "Iran Port Bustles in Shadow of War," Washington Times, March 14, 2007.
153. Cordesman, Iran's Developing Military Capabilities, pp. 72-73.
154. The Serbs had the SA-6, SA-7, SA-9/13, SA-14, SA-16, and SA-18, in addition to antiaircraft artillery. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Kosovo and the Continuing SEAD Challenge," Report RP-1018 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), p. 16.
155. Ibid.
156. Ibid., pp. 12-13.