Choosing from a large tournament

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 301-309

  Fey, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 47849094806     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0279-3     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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