Creating demand for global governance: The making of a global money-laundering problem

Global Society

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 155-178

  Hülsse, Rainer ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INTERNATIONAL LAW; POLICY MAKING; STATE ROLE;

EID: 47749142197     PISSN: 13600826     EISSN: 1469798X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13600820701201731     Document Type: Article

References (115)

1. David Held and Anthony McGrew, "Introduction", in David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 5.
2. For examples of the global governance approach see the edited volume by Held and McGrew, op. cit.; for a critical discussion see Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.), Approaches to Global Governance Theory (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999).
3. See, in particular, Ole Wæver et al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993)
4. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
5. It is important to note, however, that the Copenhagen School's distinction between "securitisation" and "securitising move" is not adopted here. The latter term describes the presentation of something as an existential threat; however, only if the audience accepts this move can it be called "securitisation";
6. see Buzan, Wæver and deWilde, op. cit., p. 25. As audience acceptance is not analysed, here any attempt to create a political problem is called "problematisation", regardless of its success.
7. R.T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 137.
8. See Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics", International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2 (1999), pp. 379-408
9. Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change", International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2001), pp. 553-588
10. Jens Steffek, "The Legitimation of International Governance: A Discourse Approach", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2003), pp. 249-275.
11. For teaching and socialisation, respectively, see Checkel, op. cit. and Frank Schimmelfennig, "International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2000), pp. 109-139
12. for securing compliance by principled debate along the lines of Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action, see Thomas Risse, "'Let's Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics", International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2000), pp. 1-39.
13. John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 553.
14. Risse, op. cit., p. 20.
15. Thomas Risse, "Global Governance and Communicative Action", Government and Opposition, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2004), p. 302.
16. Ibid., p. 306.
17. Ibid.
18. See Matthias Leonhard Maier, "Politikfelder und Politikimplementationen. Sammelrezension. Ideen und Policies", Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2001), p. 531.
19. Nicholas Onuf, AWorld of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
20. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966).
21. John R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995).
22. Frank Nullmeier, "Interpretative Ansätze in der Politikwissenschaft", in Arthur Benz andWolfgang Seibel (eds.), Theorieentwicklung in der Politikwissenschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997), p. 113.
23. See Rainer Hd̈u lsse, Metaphern der EU-Erweiterung als Konstruktionen europaïscher Identität (Baden- Baden: Nomos, 2003), pp. 14-15.
24. Oran R. Young, Governance in World Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 6.
25. See Volker Rittberger and Michael Zurn, "Regime Theory: Findings from the Study of East- West Regimes", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1991), pp. 165-183.
26. See, for example, Beth A. Simmons, "International Efforts against Money Laundering", in Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 244-263
27. Phil Williams, "Crime, Illicit Markets, and Money Laundering", in P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudrat (eds.), Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 106-150.
28. Here, one could cite a list of authors, many of whom would consider themselves to be poststructuralists rather than constructivists. See, for example, Jennifer Milliken, The Social Construction of the Korean War: Conflict and its Possibilities (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001); Iver B. Neumann, Uses of the Other: "The East" in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
29. JuttaWeldes and Diana Saco, "Making State Action Possible: The United States and the Discursive Construction of 'The Cuban Problem', 1960-1994", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1996), pp. 361-395.
30. Jutta Weldes, "The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity and Missiles in Cuba", in Jutta Weldes et al. (eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp. 35-62.
31. Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op. cit.
32. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126-155.
33. For example, Stephen Gill, American Hegemony and the Trilateral Commission (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
34. Richard Little, "The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations", European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2000), p. 409; emphasis added
35. Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-35
36. Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program", International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992), pp. 367-390.
37. Haas, op. cit., p. 2.
38. Even the research that does investigate the problem definition phase of the policy cycle does not fully satisfy more radical policy analysts. Carol Lee Bacchi criticises such work for still falling short of endogenising the problem as the existence of objective problems is assumed. Definitions may vary somewhat, but the problem nevertheless remains the same. Radical approaches, like her own, emphasise that problems are created before they can be defined;
39. see Carol Lee Bacchi, Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems (London: Sage, 1999), p. 20.
40. See Paul Sabatier, "An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policyoriented Learning Therein", Policy Sciences Vol. 21 (1988), pp. 129-168
41. Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (eds.), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
42. See, for example, J.R. Gusfield, The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
43. Barbara Nelson, Making an Issue of Child Abuse: Political Agenda Setting for Social Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
44. Bacchi, op. cit.
45. Markus Jachtenfuchs, International Policy-making as a Learning Process? The European Union and the Greenhouse Effect (Aldershot: Avebury, 1996).
46. Marteen A. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 15.
47. Herbert Gottweis, "Post-positivistische Zugänge in der Policy-Forschung", in Matthias Leonhard Maier et al. (eds.), Politik als Lernprozess? Wissenszentrierte Ansätze in der Politikanalyse (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2003), p. 133.
48. Braithwaite and Drahos, op. cit., p. 553.
49. See, for example, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, "The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 219-244.
50. FritzW. Scharpf, Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
51. Keohane and Nye, op. cit.
52. See, for example, the discussion on the effectiveness of environmental regimes in the edited volumes by Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy (eds.), Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993),
53. and Oran R. Young (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: The Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999).
54. Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Power of Liberal International Organizations", in Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (eds.), Power in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 169
55. Hurd, op. cit., p. 381.
56. Of course, this distinction is an analytical and therefore an artificial one. In actual discourse, the two will often appear together. Normative persuasion, for example, also re-constructs the problem to which the rules respond, because arguing the effectiveness of rules entails the (re-)construction of the problem itself. If an international regulator claims that a specific rule is capable of solving the problem shared by regulator and rule addressee, it automatically reproduces the problem.
57. For a brief history of money-laundering see Naylor, op. cit., pp. 134-137
58. for the following description of global governance in the realm of money-laundering see, in particular, Eric Helleiner, "State Power and the Regulation of Illicit Activity in Global Finance", in Richard H. Freeman and Peter Andreas (eds.), The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 53-90
59. Beth A. Simmons, "International Efforts against Money-laundering", op. cit.
60. Beth A. Simmons, "The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation", International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 3 (2001), pp. 589-620
61. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy: Governing without Government (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 1998), pp. 156-172
62. Phil Williams and Gregory Baudin-O'Hayon, "Global Governance, Transnational Organized Crime and Money Laundering", in David Held and Anthony Mc Grew (eds.), Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 127-144.
63. The first and principal of FATF's recommendations is that states ought to criminalise moneylaundering. Another important Recommendation is the fourth, which prescribes that banking secrecy laws should not inhibit the implementation of the 40 Recommendations.
64. These range from issuing a warning letter to the expulsion from the organisation. However, performance of FATF members proved to be fairly good and FATF hardly ever needed to threaten the use of sanctions.
65. For an excellent account of FATF's blacklisting see J.C. Sharman, "The Global Anti-money Laundering Regime and Developing Countries: Damned if they Do, Damned if they Don't?", Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, California, 22-25 March 2006.
66. Again, there is a parallel to securitisation theory, which analyses security by analysing discourse; see Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, op. cit., p. 25.
67. For the website see http://www.fatf-gafi.org (accessed 18 September 2006).
68. FATF Annual Report 1993-1994, p. 19; hereinafter, in the footnotes, FATF Annual Reports are quoted as AR.
69. AR 1991-1992, p. 29.
70. Jonathan M. Winer, Illicit Finance and Global Conflict, Fafo-Report 380 (2002), Fafo Institute for Applied Sciences, p. 44; available: http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/380/380.pdf (accessed 18 September 2006).
71. FATF/OECD Policy Brief (1999), p. 2; available: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ dataoecd/32/26/34047538.pdf (accessed 18 September 2006).
72. AR 1995-1996, p. 10.
73. AR 1991-1992, Annex, p. 31.
74. AR 1992-1993, p. 21.
75. AR 1995-1996, p. 10.
76. AR 1993-1994, p. 19; AR 1996-1997, p. 7.
77. AR 1991-1992, Annex, p. 31.
78. AR 1993-1996, p. 6.
79. AR 1991-1992, p. 31.
80. Similar to my understanding of how declamation matters for the social construction of problems, securitisation theory argues that speech acts are central to the process of "securitising"; see Buzan, Wæer and de Wilde, op. cit., p. 26.
81. This term, of course, is borrowed from Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, who have brilliantly described the role of "objectivation" for the social construction of reality; see Berger and Luckmann, op. cit.
82. AR 1993-1994, p. 6.
83. AR 1991-1992, p. 31.
84. AR 1991-1992, p. 31.
85. Here, we are dealing only with the way in which FATF's language use constitutes objectivity. This is not to deny that other practices are important in this respect, too. FATF's inclusion of experts is one such practice.
86. AR 1992-1993, p. 22.
87. AR 1994-1995, p. 24.
88. AR 1996-1997, p. 22
89. Simmons, "The International Politics of Harmonization", op. cit., p. 608.
90. AR 2003-2004, p. 19.
91. AR 1989-1990, pp. 3-4.
92. AR 1995-1996, p. 7.
93. See Michael Woodiwiss, "Transnational Organized Crime: The Strange Career of an American Concept", in Margaret Beare (ed.), Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), pp. 3-34. The construction of "transnational organized crime" as a major security threat after 1990 is itself a highly interesting subject. For a Foucauldian approach to this
94. see Adam Edwards and Peter Gill, "The Politics of 'Transnational Organized Crime': Discourse, Reflexivity and the Narration of 'Threat'", British Journal of Politics and International Relations Vol. 4, No. 2 (2002), pp. 245-270.
95. FATF/OECD Policy Brief, op. cit., p. 3.
96. Ibid.
97. Thomas Biersteker, "Targeting Terrorist Finance: The New Challenges of Financial Market Globalization", in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 74-82
98. Armand Kersten, "Financing of Terrorism - A Predicate Offense to Money Laundering?, in Mark Pieth (ed.), Financing Terrorism (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 49-56
99. Jonathan M. Winer and Trifin J. Roule, "Fighting Terrorist Finance", Survival, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2002), pp. 87-104.
100. Williams and Baudin-O'Hayon, op. cit., p. 138.
101. AR 2001-2002, p. 1.
102. AR 1990-1991, p. 16.
103. AR 1990-1991, p. 16.
104. AR 1991-1992, p. 17.
105. FATF/OECD Policy Brief (1999), op. cit., p. 3.
106. Ibid.
107. AR 1989-1990, p. 25.
108. AR 1990-1991, p. 12.
109. AR 1991-1992, Annex, p. 31.
110. AR 1992-1993, p. 24
111. see also AR 1989-1990, p. 28.
112. AR 1991-1992, Annex, p. 31.
113. AR 1997-1998, p. 34.
114. AR 2001-2002, p. 6.
115. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics", International Organization, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2005), pp. 39-75.