Why Tariffs, Not Subsidies? A Search for Stylized Facts

B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy

Volumn 5, Issue 1, 2006, Pages

  Ederington, Josh ^a   Minier, Jenny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

empirical political economy; subsidies; tariffs

Indexed keywords

EID: 47749135803     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19351682     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1515/1538-0645.1579     Document Type: Article

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