On the endogenous choice between protection and promotion

Economics and Politics

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 33-51

  Mitra, Devashish ^a  

^a FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040213287     PISSN: 09541985     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00067     Document Type: Article

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