Reconsidering the empirical evidence on the Grossman-Helpman model of endogenous protection

Canadian Journal of Economics

Volumn 41, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 501-516

  Ederington, Josh ^a   Minier, Jenny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE; METHODOLOGY; MODELING; POLITICAL ECONOMY; PREDICTION; PROTECTIONISM; TRADE FLOW;

EID: 47749119221     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: 15405982     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2008.00472.x     Document Type: Article

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