Strategic bidding in continuous double auctions

Artificial Intelligence

Volumn 172, Issue 14, 2008, Pages 1700-1729

  Vytelingum, P ^a   Cliff, D ^b   Jennings, N R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Bidding strategy; Continuous double auction; Evolutionary game theory

Indexed keywords

AGENTS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; COMMERCE; COMPETITION; EARNINGS; EDUCATION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; RISK ASSESSMENT; STABILIZERS (AGENTS);

BIDDING BEHAVIOUR; BIDDING STRATEGIES; CONTINUOUS DOUBLE AUCTIONS (CDA); CURRENT STATE; EVOLUTIONARY GAMES; LONG-TERM LEARNING; MARKET DEMANDS; MARKET FLUCTUATIONS; MARKET INFORMATION; STATIC AND DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS; STRATEGIC BIDDING; TRADE OFFS; TRADING AGENTS;

MARKETING;

EID: 47649107408     PISSN: 00043702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.artint.2008.06.001     Document Type: Article

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