On psychopaths and culpability

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 117-140

  Haji, Ishtiyaque ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032399970     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3504987     Document Type: Article

References (66)

1. Carl Elliott, The Rules of Insanity: Moral Responsibility and the Mentally Ill Offender (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 71.
2. In most of what follows, I will simply assume, but not argue for, this "dependence" thesis. I shall say more about whether the state's right (assuming it has such a right) to punish transgression of a morally justified law depends upon blameworthiness in the last section below.
3. The Rules of Insanity: pp. 5, 79, 124.
4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, tr. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), esp. Bk. III.
5. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
6. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
7. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
8. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
9. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
10. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
11. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
12. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
13. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
14. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
15. People have differed over the relevant conceptualization of control. Many have argued, for example, that having the relevant sort of control over an action requires having 'the freedom to do otherwise'; there must be genuinely open alternatives accessible to the agent. (See, for example, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics III 1 1110a 1 ff; and Peter van Inwagen's discussion in An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chs. 3, 4). Susan Wolf has claimed that the type of control required for moral responsibility is the freedom to act in accord with the true and the good. (See Wolf's Freedom Within Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and 'Asymmetrical Freedom", Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): pp. 151-166). On yet another highly influential account of control, an action is under an agent's control if it issues from an agent's first-order desire that "meshes" in an appropriate way with that agent's higher-order propositional attitudes. (See, for instance, Harry G. Frankfurt's pieces 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person', Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): pp. 5-20; and 'Identification and Wholeheartedness', in F. D. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987): pp. 27-45. See, also, Eleonore Stump's 'Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993): pp. 211-234). John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have proposed that a person has the relevant sort of control over an action if (very sketchily) the action issues from a reasons- responsive mechanism; see 'Responsibility and Inevitability', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 258-278; 'Responsibility for Consequences' in Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 322-347; 'Responsiveness and Moral Responsibility' in Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: pp. 81-106, and Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
16. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose and defend an account of authenticity in Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, especially, ch. 8. An insightful discussion on authenticity and autonomy can be found in Alfred Mele's Autonomous Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For my own views on authenticity see Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), forthcoming, chs. 6-7.
17. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose and defend an account of authenticity in Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, especially, ch. 8. An insightful discussion on authenticity and autonomy can be found in Alfred Mele's Autonomous Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For my own views on authenticity see Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), forthcoming, chs. 6-7.
18. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza propose and defend an account of authenticity in Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility, especially, ch. 8. An insightful discussion on authenticity and autonomy can be found in Alfred Mele's Autonomous Agents (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). For my own views on authenticity see Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), forthcoming, chs. 6-7.
19. See Moral Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities.
20. The Rules of Insanity, p. 76.
21. The Rules of Insanity: pp. 75-76.
22. The Rules of Insanity: pp. 76-77.
23. The Rules of Insanity: pp. 78-79.
24. The Rules of Insanity: p. 79.
25. The Rules of Insanity: p. 79.
26. The Rules of Insanity: pp. 79-80.
27. On this theme, see, for example, Bernard Williams, 'Persons, Character, and Morality', in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981): pp. 1-19.
28. Harry Frankfurt, 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love', in Hans Friedrich Rulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (eds.), Vernunftbergriffe in der Moderne (Stuttgart: Kletta-Cotta, 1994): pp. 433-447, p. 446. For similar remarks, see Barbara Herman, 'Agency, Attachment, and Difference', in John Deigh (ed.), Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992): pp. 41-63, p. 46.
29. Harry Frankfurt, 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love', in Hans Friedrich Rulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (eds.), Vernunftbergriffe in der Moderne (Stuttgart: Kletta-Cotta, 1994): pp. 433-447, p. 446. For similar remarks, see Barbara Herman, 'Agency, Attachment, and Difference', in John Deigh (ed.), Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992): pp. 41-63, p. 46.
30. Against Elliott's view that moral concerns generally outweigh other concerns, see, for example: Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality' in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): pp. 77-107; Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): pp. 181-188; Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): pp. 419-439; Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck' in Moral Luck: pp. 20-39; John Kekes (1992) 'On There Being Some Limits To Morality', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), The Good Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 63-80; and David Copp, 'The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason', Social Philosophy and Policy 1997, forthcoming.
31. Against Elliott's view that moral concerns generally outweigh other concerns, see, for example: Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality' in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): pp. 77-107; Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): pp. 181-188; Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): pp. 419-439; Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck' in Moral Luck: pp. 20-39; John Kekes (1992) 'On There Being Some Limits To Morality', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), The Good Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 63-80; and David Copp, 'The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason', Social Philosophy and Policy 1997, forthcoming.
32. Against Elliott's view that moral concerns generally outweigh other concerns, see, for example: Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality' in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): pp. 77-107; Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): pp. 181-188; Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): pp. 419-439; Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck' in Moral Luck: pp. 20-39; John Kekes (1992) 'On There Being Some Limits To Morality', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), The Good Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 63-80; and David Copp, 'The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason', Social Philosophy and Policy 1997, forthcoming.
33. Against Elliott's view that moral concerns generally outweigh other concerns, see, for example: Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality' in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): pp. 77-107; Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): pp. 181-188; Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): pp. 419-439; Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck' in Moral Luck: pp. 20-39; John Kekes (1992) 'On There Being Some Limits To Morality', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), The Good Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 63-80; and David Copp, 'The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason', Social Philosophy and Policy 1997, forthcoming.
34. Against Elliott's view that moral concerns generally outweigh other concerns, see, for example: Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality' in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): pp. 77-107; Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): pp. 181-188; Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): pp. 419-439; Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck' in Moral Luck: pp. 20-39; John Kekes (1992) 'On There Being Some Limits To Morality', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), The Good Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 63-80; and David Copp, 'The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason', Social Philosophy and Policy 1997, forthcoming.
35. Against Elliott's view that moral concerns generally outweigh other concerns, see, for example: Michael Slote, 'Admirable Immorality' in Goods and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983): pp. 77-107; Philippa Foot, 'Are Moral Considerations Overriding?' in Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978): pp. 181-188; Susan Wolf, 'Moral Saints', Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): pp. 419-439; Bernard Williams, 'Moral Luck' in Moral Luck: pp. 20-39; John Kekes (1992) 'On There Being Some Limits To Morality', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, Jr., and J. Paul (eds.), The Good Life and the Human Good (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992): pp. 63-80; and David Copp, 'The Ring of Gyges: On the Unity of Practical Reason', Social Philosophy and Policy 1997, forthcoming.
36. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1891) (ed.), Oskar Piest (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1989): p. 23.
37. For an opposing view, see Peter Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 45-66. For insightful discussion of this theory, see Gary Watson, 'Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 119-148.
38. For an opposing view, see Peter Strawson's 'Freedom and Resentment' in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 45-66. For insightful discussion of this theory, see Gary Watson, 'Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme', in J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza, (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility: pp. 119-148.
39. The Rules of Insanity, p. 77.
40. Defenders of this view include: Lloyd Fields, 'Moral Beliefs and Blame-worthiness', Philosophy 69 (1994): pp. 397-415; Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking 'Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/Foresight Distinction', Utilitas 6 (1994): pp. 201-216; David Widerker, 'Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities', Analysis 51 (1991): pp. 222-224; Holly M. Smith, 'Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 279-303; and Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984): pp. 51, 52.
41. Defenders of this view include: Lloyd Fields, 'Moral Beliefs and Blame- worthiness', Philosophy 69 (1994): pp. 397-415; Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking 'Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/Foresight Distinction', Utilitas 6 (1994): pp. 201-216; David Widerker, 'Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities', Analysis 51 (1991): pp. 222-224; Holly M. Smith, 'Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 279-303; and Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984): pp. 51, 52.
42. Defenders of this view include: Lloyd Fields, 'Moral Beliefs and Blame- worthiness', Philosophy 69 (1994): pp. 397-415; Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking 'Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/Foresight Distinction', Utilitas 6 (1994): pp. 201-216; David Widerker, 'Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities', Analysis 51 (1991): pp. 222-224; Holly M. Smith, 'Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 279-303; and Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984): pp. 51, 52.
43. Defenders of this view include: Lloyd Fields, 'Moral Beliefs and Blame- worthiness', Philosophy 69 (1994): pp. 397-415; Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking 'Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/Foresight Distinction', Utilitas 6 (1994): pp. 201-216; David Widerker, 'Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities', Analysis 51 (1991): pp. 222-224; Holly M. Smith, 'Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 279-303; and Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984): pp. 51, 52.
44. Defenders of this view include: Lloyd Fields, 'Moral Beliefs and Blame- worthiness', Philosophy 69 (1994): pp. 397-415; Justin Oakley and Dean Cocking 'Consequentialism, Moral Responsibility, and the Intention/Foresight Distinction', Utilitas 6 (1994): pp. 201-216; David Widerker, 'Frankfurt on 'Ought Implies Can' and Alternative Possibilities', Analysis 51 (1991): pp. 222-224; Holly M. Smith, 'Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit', Ethics 101 (1991): pp. 279-303; and Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984): pp. 51, 52.
45. For more on this distinction, see Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 46; Michael Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, New Jersay: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 42, and 'A Plea for Accuses', American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): pp. 229-243, especially, Sec. 1.
46. For more on this distinction, see Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 46; Michael Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, New Jersay: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 42, and 'A Plea for Accuses', American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): pp. 229-243, especially, Sec. 1.
47. For more on this distinction, see Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986), p. 46; Michael Zimmerman, An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, New Jersay: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), p. 42, and 'A Plea for Accuses', American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): pp. 229-243, especially, Sec. 1.
48. See Harry Frankfurt, 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility', Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): pp. 828-839.
49. There is heated dispute over whether Frankfurt-type cases show both that an agent cannot do otherwise than what she in fact does, and that she is morally responsible for what she does. For a recent thorough discussion of Frankfurt-type cases and their relevance to the control dimension of responsibility, see John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994). See, in addition, Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, and David Widerker's 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities', The Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 247-261.
50. There is heated dispute over whether Frankfurt-type cases show both that an agent cannot do otherwise than what she in fact does, and that she is morally responsible for what she does. For a recent thorough discussion of Frankfurt-type cases and their relevance to the control dimension of responsibility, see John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994). See, in addition, Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, and David Widerker's 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities', The Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 247-261.
51. There is heated dispute over whether Frankfurt-type cases show both that an agent cannot do otherwise than what she in fact does, and that she is morally responsible for what she does. For a recent thorough discussion of Frankfurt-type cases and their relevance to the control dimension of responsibility, see John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994). See, in addition, Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, and David Widerker's 'Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities', The Philosophical Review 104 (1995): pp. 247-261.
52. An important (recent) defense and discussion of (K) can be found in Michael Zimmerman's The Concept of Moral Obligation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially, Sees. 2.2 and 3.1.
53. The case I present is an adaptation of one discussed by Alfred Mele in Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 22.
54. On misalignments between evaluative judgments and motivations, see, for example, Irrationality, chs. 3, 6; Alfred Mele, Springs of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 9; and Gary Watson, 'Free Agency', Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): pp. 205-220.
55. On misalignments between evaluative judgments and motivations, see, for example, Irrationality, chs. 3, 6; Alfred Mele, Springs of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 9; and Gary Watson, 'Free Agency', Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): pp. 205-220.
56. On misalignments between evaluative judgments and motivations, see, for example, Irrationality, chs. 3, 6; Alfred Mele, Springs of Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), ch. 9; and Gary Watson, 'Free Agency', Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): pp. 205-220.
57. For other arguments against the Objective View, see Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, ch. 8.
58. See Julia Driver, 'The Suberogatory', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992): pp. 286-295. See, also, Paul McNamara, "Making Room for Going Beyond the Call", Mind 105 (1996): pp. 415-450; and Gregory Mellema, Beyond The Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1991).
59. See Julia Driver, 'The Suberogatory', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992): pp. 286-295. See, also, Paul McNamara, "Making Room for Going Beyond the Call", Mind 105 (1996): pp. 415-450; and Gregory Mellema, Beyond The Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1991).
60. See Julia Driver, 'The Suberogatory', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992): pp. 286-295. See, also, Paul McNamara, "Making Room for Going Beyond the Call", Mind 105 (1996): pp. 415-450; and Gregory Mellema, Beyond The Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation, and Offence (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1991).
61. See Appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, ch. 9. The primary reason my acceptance of revised Blame2 is tentative is that it is possible that a person is to blame for a suberogatory action when, in performing it, she believes that she is doing no moral wrong but does believe that she is doing something morally indecent. For development of this issue see 'The Supererogatory, the Suberogatory, and Appraisability', in progress.
62. For further elaboration and defense of principle Blame2, see 'An Epistemic Dimension of Blameworthiness', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997): pp. 523-544.
63. David Copp, who is an objectivist (see his 'Defending the Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Blameworthiness and Moral Responsibility', forthcoming in Nous), has stated, in correspondence, that he would be willing to endorse something like revised Blame2.
64. Jeffrie G. Murphy, 'Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy', in Ethics and Personality: Essays in Moral Psychology, pp. 207-221.
65. For further discussion of Alfredo's case, and defense of the view that there are varieties of normative blameworthiness, see appraisability: Puzzles, Proposals, and Perplexities, ch. 11.
66. I thank anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions.