Iterated prisoner's dilemma in an asocial world dominated by loners, not by defectors

Theoretical Population Biology

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 1-5

  Castro, Laureano ^a   Toro, Miguel A ^a  

^a INIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Loner; Prisoner's dilemma; Tit for tat

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; MUTATION; PRISONER DILEMMA; TIT-FOR-TAT;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; GROUP PROCESS; HUMAN; STATISTICAL MODEL; THEORETICAL MODEL;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; MODELS, STATISTICAL; MODELS, THEORETICAL;

EID: 46449113776     PISSN: 00405809     EISSN: 10960325     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2008.04.001     Document Type: Article

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