Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping - Conflict Resolution through State-Building and Democracy Promotion in Haiti

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law

Volumn 10, Issue , 2006, Pages 465-530

  Leininger, Julia ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 46249113843     PISSN: 13894633     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1163/187574106x00119     Document Type: Article

References (258)

1. B. Fassbender, UN Reform and Collective Security. The Report of the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of December 2004 and the Recommendations of the UN Secretary-General from March 2005, Global Issue Papers 17 April 2005, 15-16, available at: .
2. For further explanation of the development of peace-keeping see under II. 1. in this article.
3. D. Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council. The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997, 1998, 1.
4. The “enemy clause” of Article 107 UN Charter constitutes, indeed, a further exception, but it has lost its significance over time and is not applied anymore.
5. J. Cockayne/D. Malone, “United Nations Peace Operations Then and Now”, in: H. Langholtz et al. (eds), International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 9 (2004), 1 et seq. (8);
6. C.E. Philipp, “Somalia-A Very Special Case”, in: R. Wolfrum/A. von Bogdandy, Max Planck UNYB 9 (2005), 518 et seq. (527).
7. Cockayne/Malone, see note 5, 9.
8. Although this twofold composition of UN peace-keeping missions suggests a constant homogeneous structure of missions, in fact peace-keeping missions vary especially with regard to their form and mandate.
9. W. Kühne, “Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed”, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4 (1999), 358 et seq. (359-360). Furthermore, the development of peace-keeping missions was highly influenced by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's reflections, outlined in An Agenda for Peace Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992.
10. A. Cutillo, International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict: A Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding, Policy Paper of the International Peace Academy, February 2006, 1, available at: .
11. E.M. Cousens et al., Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, 2001.
12. Though the category “post-conflict” is widely accepted, its interpretation differs from case to case.
13. M. Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 1984, 91.
14. S. Chesterman et al., Making States Work. From State Failure to State-Building, 2004, 16.
15. A. Bogdandy et al., “State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Appraisal of Different Approaches”, Max Planck UNYB, see note 5, 580 et seq. (583-584).
16. Chesterman, see note 13, 2.
17. M. Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States”, Development and Change 33 (2002), 1001 et seq.
18. Bogdandy et al., see note 14, 591.
19. E.g. for a synonymous use see J. Dobbin et al., The UN's Role in Nation-Building, from the Congo to Iraq, 2005. S. Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, 2005 attributes nation-building merely to post-conflict situations. In turn, F. Fukuyama, State-building, Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, 2004, makes an analytical distinction, but states its synonymous use in politics.
20. R. Wolfrum, “International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by the United Nations and Other International Actors”, Max Planck UNYB, see note 5, 649 et seq. (653).
21. Well-known citation of A. Lincoln, from the U.S.-American civil war in 1863. For a systematic research on democracy see exemplarily Democracy, 1998 and D. Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd edition, 1996.
22. M.M. Brown, “Democratic Governance: Towards a Framework for Sustainable Peace”, Global Governance 9 (2003), 142 et seq.
23. Ch. Kumar/S. Lodge et al., Sustainable Peace Through Democratization: The Experiences of Haiti and Guatemala, IPA Policy Paper, March 2002, 6.
24. Brown, see note 21.
25. Direct measures to promote democracy refer to the enforcement of democratic institutions and procedures as well as the participation of civil society. Indirect measures focus on the output of the political system.
26. For a further distinction between democracy promotion and democracy protection see below.
27. This also applies to state-building.
28. For a discussion of this issue see under II. 2. of this article.
29. J.J. Linz/A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 1996, 17.
30. The term “transition” is here used in a twofold way. On the one hand it refers to the process from conflict to resolution of a conflict. On the other hand in the context of democracy promotion it relates to the change of a political regime.
31. T. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy 13 (2002), 5 et seq. (7).
32. L. Zanotti, “Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and Normalization”, International Peacekeeping 13 (2006), 150 et seq. (151).
33. J. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization”, International Organization 56 (2002), 515 et seq. (515).
34. G. Crawford, “Promoting Democracy from Without - Learning from Within”, Democratization 11 (2003), 77 et seq. (80).
35. For an overview compare: R. Rich/E. Newman, “Introduction: Approaching Democratization Policy”, in: E. Newman/R. Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, between Ideals and Reality, 2004, 3 et seq.
36. P. Burnell, “Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse”, in: id., Democracy Assistance, International Co-operation for Democratization, 2000, 4 et seq. (12) and Linz/Stepan, see note 28.
37. K. Kumar, “International Assistance for Post-Conflict Elections”, in: Burnell, see note 35, 191 et seq. (191-192). The elections in July 2006 in the Congo form a good example in this respect.
38. T.M. Franck, “The Democratic Entitlement”, University of Richmond Law Review 29 (1994-1995), 1 et seq. (34).
39. Although coercive measures pursuant to Chapter VII UN Charter vary, e.g. economic sanctions, use of force, in this section reference is only made to military measures due to their significance in the case of Haiti. Other coercive measures which are widely used and were also applied in Haiti will be addressed below.
40. R. Falk, “The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for the United Nations”, Harv. Int.l L. J. 36 (1995), 341 et seq. (345).
41. S/RES/940 (1994) of 31 July 1994.
42. Literature see below in section a. of this Chapter.
43. T.M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, AJIL 86 (1992), 46 et seq.
44. Franck, see note 37, 34.
45. T. Farer, “The Promotion of Democracy: International Law and Norms”, in: E. Newman/R. Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, between Ideals and Reality, 2004, 32 et seq. (33).
46. See note 42, as well as J. Wouters et al., “Democracy and International Law”, NYIL 34 (2003), 137 et seq. (154-156)
47. J. Crawford, “Democracy and the Body of International Law”, in: G.H. Fox/B.R. Roth (eds), Democratic Governance and International Law, 2000, 91 et seq. (101).
48. Franck, see note 37, 9. On this particular aspect see the next paragraph.
49. Wolfrum, see note 19, 679.
50. Franck, see note 37, 12-15.
51. This issue will be further elaborated by examining the OAS in the following section of this article.
52. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949.
53. Article 3 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Council of Europe of 5 May 1949.
54. Article 6 (1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997.
55. Article 2 of the Charter of the OAS of 30 April 1948.
56. Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000.
57. The term electoral assistance is here used in a broad sense, comprising assistance of the organization and conduct, verification, coordination, technical assistance, follow-up and report as well as training of national observers.
58. C.C. Joyner, “The United Nations and Democracy”, Global Governance 5 (1999), 333 et seq. (342-349).
59. A/RES/47/138 of 18 December 1992.
60. See Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Venice Commission in July 2002 or International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), International Electoral Standards, Guidelines for Reviewing the Legal Framework of Elections, 2004.
61. R. Ludwig, “The UN's Electoral Assistance: Challenges, Accomplishments, Prospects”, in: E. Newman/R. Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, between Ideals and Reality, 2004, 169 et seq. (177-179).
62. For an overview of state practice in order to assist national elections see Joyner, see note 56, 344, Table 1. Joyner also provides the legal sources reflecting the opinio iuris of UN Member States.
63. Further conferences were held in Manila (1988), Managua (1994), Bucharest (1997), Cotonou (2000) and Ulaanbaatar (2003 and a follow-up conference in 2006). The next one will be in Qatar, November 2006.
64. Joyner, see note 56, 335.
65. A/RES/49/30 of 7 December 1994; A/RES/50/133 of 20 December 1995; A/RES/51/31 of 6 December 1996; and A/RES/52/18 of 21 November 1997.
66. Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, Report of the Secretary-General, Doc. A/52/513 of 21 October 1997.
67. United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2 of 8 September 2000.
68. See paras 135-137, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 of 16 September 2005. The Fund will provide assistance to governmental, non-governmental, national, regional, and international organizations, including relevant UN departments, offices, funds, programmes and agencies. The Fund will complement current UN efforts to strengthen and expand democracy worldwide.
69. For an analysis of the background of the Charter see J. Graham, A Magna Charta for the Americas, the Inter-American Democratic Charter: Genesis, Challenges and Canadian connections, 2002, Policy paper of FOCAL, 3, available at: .
70. Preamble, OAS Charter. In accordance with article 145 of the Charter it entered into force on 13 December 1951. Further references to democracy are made in arts 2b), 3d), 3f), 9a), 9d) 31, 45f), 47 and 95c) of the OAS Charter.
71. C. Gavíria, “The Future of the Hemisphere”, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 39 (1997), 5 et seq. (7).
72. Doc. OAS AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91), paras 1 and 2.
73. Doc. OAS AG/ACT/3 (XVI-E/92) referring to the modification of article 9 of the Charter of the OAS. The Protocol of Washington was agreed on 14 December 1992 and entered into force in 1997.
74. For instance, “Resolution 1080” was thereby strengthened. In face of coup d'états which lead to the overthrow of democratic elected governments it refers to a “… sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government.” In turn, article 19 of the IADC extends the elements defining the breach of democratic order as “… an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state.”
75. All 34 Heads of State and Government signed the Charter. For an analysis of the decision-making process which led to its adoption see note 67 as well as A.F. Cooper/T. Legler, “A Tale of Two Mesas: The OAS Defense of Democracy in Peru and Venezuela”, Global Governance 11 (2005), 425 et seq. (425).
76. Up to the adoption of the Democratic Charter, reactive instruments in order to protect democracy of Member States, once overthrown, prevailed in the OAS; Ch. Hartmann, “Demokratie als Leitbild der afrikanischen Staatengemeinschaft? Zur Theorie und Praxis demokratischer Schutzklauseln in der Afrikanischen Union”, VRÜ 38 (2005), 201 et seq. (205), differs between two functions of democracy clauses in regional arrangements. Firstly, the protection of democracy as in the case of the OAS and EU. Secondly, the assessment of the democratic quality of Member States, e.g. the African Union.
77. In the words of article 1 of the IADC: “The peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of the Americas.”
78. Gavíria, see note 69.
79. See e.g. Preamble, arts 2b), 3d), 3f), 9a), 9d) of the OAS Charter. Only Venezuela opposes this definition and insists that the term “participatory democracy” should be included in the organization's framework.
80. Since even the Preamble of the Charter of the OAS refers to democracy. It was successively completed by various amendments of the Charter in 1985, 1992 and 1995. For a more detailed description see above.
81. Resolution 1080 was applied in the cases of Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Guatemala (1993), and Paraguay (1996). The IADC in the cases of Haiti (2001), Venezuela (2002), Bolivia (2003), Haiti (2004), Bolivia (2005) and Nicaragua (2005).
82. E.G. OAS, Carta Democrática Interamericana. Documentos e interpretaciones, 2003, edited by H. Calle, available at: .
83. The evolution of an opinio iuris is affirmed by E. Lagos/T.D. Rudy, “The Third Summit of the Americas and the Thirty-first Sessions of the OAS General Assembly”, AJIL 96 (2002), 173 et seq. (180).
84. See article 19 OAS Charter in this respect, and H. Caminos, “La OEA: Pasado, Presente y Futuro”, in: L. Perret/A. Reus-Bazán (eds), La Organización de los Estados Americanos en el Centenario del Sistema Interamericano, 1990, 16 et seq. (20).
85. Ch. Fulda, Demokratie und pacta sunt servanda, 2002, 31. Furthermore Lagos/Rudy, see note 80, 177 summarize the discussion whether the provisions of the IADC require an amendment of article 23 of the OAS Charter. The latter impairs the principle of non-intervention which is no bar to measures taken “for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties”. A systematic interpretation alludes to the definition of democracy which is seen as precondition for peace in the Western Hemisphere. In turn, democracy promotion is one measure to maintain peace. Therefore an amendment of article 23 of the OAS Charter can be considered as obsolete.
86. Referring to its organizational nature the OAS - founded in 1948, was the first regional organization established in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. For a comprehensive analysis of the definition of regional organizations under Chapter VIII UN Charter see CH. Walter, Vereinte Nationen und Regionalorganisationen. Eine Untersuchung zu Kapitel VIII der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen, 1996, 27 et seq.
87. R. Wolfrum, “Der Beitrag regionaler Abmachungen zur Friedenssicherung”, ZaöRV 53 (1993), 576 et seq. (578).
88. Walter, see note 83, 149.
89. According to Article 54 UN Charter the Security Council must be informed of all measures taken to maintain international peace by regional organizations. For a detailed analysis see A. Frowein, “Zwangsmaßnahmen von Regionalorganisationen”, in: U. Beyerlin et al. (eds), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung, 1995, 57 et seq. (66-67).
90. OAS' sanctions against the Dominican Republic in 1960 build an exception.
91. E. Spehar, “The Role of the Organization of American States in Conflict Prevention”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 61 (2001), 61 et seq. (64-65) and for the relation between democracy and development see the Declaration of Managua of 10 June 1993, OAS Doc. AG/DEC/4 (XXIII-O/93 as well as the Preamble of the OAS Charter.
92. See note 40, Preamble.
93. Falk, see note 39, 344.
94. See note 40, Preamble.
95. See note 40, Preamble.
96. L. Peral, Accion del Consejo de Seguridad en Haiti:Fortalecimento de la Democrcia y Contencion del fluyo de Refugiados, 2004, Working Paper of FRIDE, available at: , 2.
97. Falk, see note 39, 356.
98. Farer, see note 44, 51.
99. See note 40, para. 2.
100. M. Bothe, “Friedenssicherung und Kriegsrecht”, in: W. Graf Vitzthum et al. (eds), Völkerrecht, 2004, 608, para. 24.
101. M.R. Trouillot, Haiti. State Against Nation. The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism, 1990, 83.
102. The peasantry comprises 90 per cent of the Haitians in total, thereof 60 per cent live in the rural areas. The remaining 10 per cent refer to the mulatto, mainly urban elite. See S. Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?”, Foreign Aff. 74 (1995), 73 et seq. (82-83).
103. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Compare M. Gélin-Adams/D. Malone, “Haiti: A Case of Endemic Weakness”, in: R. Rot-berg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 2003, 287 et seq. (298).
104. Haiti was the first nation in claiming and achieving independence in the Western Hemisphere.
105. Mintz, see note 99, 87.
106. B. Weinstein/A. Segal, Haiti. Political Failures, Cultural Successes, 1984, 17.
107. B. Weinstein/A. Segal, Haiti. Political Failures, Cultural Successes, 47-49.
108. E. Mobbekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti”, Democratization 8 (2001), 173 et seq. (79-80).
109. R. Fatton, Haiti's Predatory Republic. The Unending Transition to Democracy, 2002, 69.
110. Elections were observed by the United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH). Compare Gélin-Adams/Malone, see note 100, 296.
111. J. Mendelsson-Forman, “Security Reform in Haiti”, International Peacekeeping 13 (2006), 14 et seq. (24).
112. International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti? ICG Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 10 of 18 November 2004, International Crisis Group, 14-18.
113. Fatton, see note 106, 109.
114. International Crisis Group, Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for Préval's First 100 Days, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No. 10 of 11 May 2006, 10-11.
115. UN/World Bank et al., Republic of Haiti, Interim International Cooperation Framework, 2004-2006, para. 21, available at: . Furthermore, in terms of the economic development, foreign aid and investments rather contributed to worsen than to improve the situation due to their massive investments, which very often were followed by sudden withdrawal.
116. It is estimated that 75 per cent of the Haitian people live in poverty, thereof 55 per cent with less than one dollar per day. The UN's Human Development Index of 2005 ranks Haiti on place 153 (of 177 countries). See UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, 221, available at: .
117. Further information in the 1991 military coup see below.
118. Pursuant to article 134-3 of the Haitian Constitution of 1987, re-election of the Haitian President is prohibited. An additional term is only possible after an interval of five years. A third term is interdicted.
119. Fanmi Lavalas is a splitter of the former Movement Lavalas, which was created by Aristide and fell apart because many of his followers turned away and created a new party, called Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (Organization of the People in Battle).
120. I. Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti. The Promise of Deliberative Democracy, 1999, 146.
121. Parliamentary elections in 1997 were also fraudulent and weak in technical terms.
122. See under III. 2. c.
123. H. Carey, “Electoral Observation and Democratization in Haiti”, in: K. Middlebrook (eds), Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America, 1998, 141 et seq. (151).
124. Although the Haitian Constitution of 1987 adopted many provisions of the Fifth French Republic's Constitution, it differs in terms of restriction of executive, especially Presidential, powers. For a comparison of constitutional law in the Haitian case see L. Aucoin, “Haiti's Constitutional Crisis”, B. U. Int'l L. J. 17 (1999), 115 et seq. (121).
125. Ch. Kumar, Building Peace in Haiti, 1998, 37.
126. O.E. Sella, La Caída de Aristide, crónica de una frustración popular, 1996, 224.
127. Malone, see note 3, 61.
128. Estimated 200-300 people were killed in the direct aftermath of the coup. Compare Sella, note 124, 121.
129. See note 70.
130. OAS Doc. MRE/RES/1/91 of 3 October 1991.
131. D. Acevedo/C. Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the Protection of Democracy”, in: T. Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty. Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas 1996, 132 et seq. (143).
132. OAS Doc. MRE/RES/1/91 of 3 October 1991; OAS Doc. MRE/RES/2/91 of 8 October 1991 and OAS Doc. MRE/RES/3/91 of 8 October 1991. The OAS embargo was backed by the UN, S/RES/841 (1993) of 16 June 1993. The oil and weapon embargos' implementation was not effective due to the reluctance of some states, above all the exceptions made by the U.S. in order to protect certain sectors of its economy. Compare also D.E. Acevedo, “The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Protecting Democracy”, in: L. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraints. Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts, 1993, 118 et seq. Above all the Governors Island Agreement of 9 July 1993.
133. For more information on this mission see under III. 3. c.
134. OAS Doc. CP/RES/594 of 10 November 1992.
135. Fatton, see note 106, 77-106.
136. I. Martin, “Haiti: International Force or National Compromise?”, Journal of Latin American Studies 31 (1999), 711 et seq. (713).
137. M. Morley/C. McGillion, “'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Re-democratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti”, Political Science Quarterly 112 (1997), 363 et seq. (364).
138. See in this respect also the wording of S/RES/940, see note 40.
139. For a description of the events leading to the return of Aristide see below.
140. Fatton, see note 106, 100.
141. Doc. S/1994/1208 of 24 October 1994.
142. Malone, see note 3, 122.
143. Mendelsson-Forman, see note 109, 19.
144. D. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink”, Current History, February 2005, 83 et seq. (84-85).
145. OAS Doc. CP/RES/772 (1247/00) of 4 August 2000.
146. Fifth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States on Haiti, OAS Doc. CP/DOC354/02 of 8 January 2002, 10.
147. OAS Doc. CP/RES/806 (1303/02) Corr. 1 of 16 January 2002.
148. Various groups, also the Armée Cannibale, which formerly worked together with Aristide, formed the alliance Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationale. Once the alliance had reached its objective, it was dissolved and each group continued to exist on its own. See International Crisis Group, see note 110, 10.
149. International Crisis Group, Haiti's Transition: Hanging in the Balance, Latin American Caribbean Report No. 7 of 8 February 2005, 5.
150. J. Cholet/D. Flemes, “Haiti - ein Jahr nach dem Sturz Aristides. Leitet die UN-Stabilisierungsmission die Wende ein?”, Brennpunkt Lateinamerika 5 (2005), 46 et seq.
151. International Crisis Group, see note 110, 9.
152. This evolvement has probably two causes: first, the decreased interest of the U.S. in the Latin American region due to its heightened engagement in the Middle East. Second, the reluctance of France to a U.S. intervention into Iraq in 2003. In this context the Haitian case provided a good opportunity to prove Frances' loyalty to the last superpower.
153. Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, Doc. S/2004/300 of 16 April 2004, para. 2.
154. Erikson, see note 142, 87.
155. Erikson, see note 142, para. 9.
156. See note 151, para. 19 and para. 20.
157. See under III. 3. d.
158. Fatton, see note 106, 204.
159. S/RES/867 (1993) of 23 September 1993. Governors Island Agreement, Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General of 13 August 1993, Doc. S/26297.
160. For a detailed analysis of the Governors Island Agreement see Malone, see note 3, 78-98.
161. New York Pact, Doc. A/47/1000 Annex.
162. S/RES/861 (1993) of 27 August 1993. The oil and arms embargo was imposed by the Security Council upon request of the OAS (OAS Doc. CP/RES/594 of 10 November 1992).
163. The OAS had previously imposed a regional trade embargo which had remained ineffective (OAS Doc. MRE/RES/2/91 of 8 October 1991). After the imposition of the embargo in August 1993, the UN undertook, alongside the U.S., the lead position in the Haitian crisis.
164. Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti of 21 September 1993, Doc. S/26480.
165. S. Schnably, “The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala”, Inter-American Law Review 25 (1994), 293 et seq. (6).
166. Malone, see note 3, 91-92.
167. S/RES/841 (1993) of 16 June 1993.
168. The “Group of Friends” was initiated by France and Venezuela in 1992. It comprises Canada, France, United States and Venezuela from the outset, Argentina since 1994 and Chile since 1996.
169. S/RES/905 (1994) of 23 March 1994.
170. S/RES/917 (1994) of 6 May 1994.
171. OAS Doc. MRE/ACT/94 and CH.R. Thomas, Medio siglo de la Organización de los Estados Americanos - Panorama de un compromiso regional, 1999, 13.
172. Clinton defined the Haitian refugees as “economic” and not “political” refugees. Therefore no asylum could be granted to them and all refugees - estimated 38,000 from 1991 to 1994 - were sent back to Haiti. Compare Morley/McGillion, see note 135, 364-366.
173. Doc. S/1994/905 of 29 July 1994.
174. Kumar, see note 123, 26.
175. Sella, see note 124, 247.
176. Malone, see note 3, 110.
177. Stotzky, see note 118, 40-41.
178. In consequence of Aristide's return economic sanctions were lifted, S/RES/944 (1994) of 29 September 1994, para. 4.
179. Ibid., paras 9 and para. 10.
180. S/RES/944 (1994) of 29 September 1994, para. 1. In January 1995 its mandate was extended until 31 July 1995, S/RES/975 (1995) of 30 January 1995.
181. See for its functions in detail, A. Dobbin et al., America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, 2003, 76.
182. As to the unforeseen duties see, Background information on UNMIH, UN Department for Peace-keeping, 1997, 17, available at: .
183. See S/RES/867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, para. 5.
184. S/RES/1048 (1996) of 29 February 1996, paras 6 and 7.
185. See note 40, para. 9 (a).
186. C. Kumar/E. Cousens, Policy Briefing: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Report, 5, available at: .
187. Kumar/Cousens, see note 188, 5.
188. Mendelsson-Forman, see note 109, 20-21.
189. S/RES/1007 (1995) of 31 July 1995, para. 6.
190. Mendelsson-Forman, see note 109, 21.
191. Kumar/Cousens, see note 188, 6 and 7.
192. See S/RES/1007 (1995) of 31 July 1995.
193. See note 182, 15.
194. Doc. S/31996/416 of 5 June 1996.
195. Malone, see note 3, 134 and 137-138.
196. For an informative overview of these missions compare K. V. Hippel, Democracy by Force, US-military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 2000, 104-126.
197. Doc. S/1996/431, Annex of 31 May 1996; Doc. S/1996/956 of 13 November 1996 and Doc. S/1997/832, Annex II of 29 October 1997.
198. S/RES/1063 (1996) of 28 June 1996, para. 2.
199. S/RES/1141 (1997) of 28 November 1997, para. 3. For a short description of the new concepts see the introduction of this article.
200. UNSMIH: 1,297 military and 291 civilian police personnel, available at: ;
201. UNTMIH: 250 civilian police personnel and 50 military personnel available at: ;
202. MIPONUH: 300 civilian police personnel, available at: .
203. See note 200 para. 1 (emphasis added).
204. See note 201, para. 1.
205. Malone, see note 3, 145-147.
206. See note 201, para. 4.
207. S/RES/1277 (1999) of 30 November 1999; A/RES/54/193 of 17 December 1999.
208. Hippel, see note 198, 117-126.
209. Acronym accordant to its French naming Mission Internationale Civile en Haiti.
210. C. Granderson, “Institutionalizing Peace: The Haiti Experience”, in: A. Henkin (ed.), Honouring Human Rights, 2000, 383 et seq. (384).
211. Granderson, see note 210, 386.
212. The terms of trade on which MICIVIH's mandate was based, were not officially published by the United Nations. Martin provides the full text of the terms of reference in the annex of his article. See note 134, 113 et seq.
213. Granderson, see note 210, 386-287.
214. Martin, see note 134, 713.
215. Kumar/Cousens, see note 188, 5.
216. S/RES/1529 (2004) of 29 February 2004.
217. For an interpretation of Resolution 940 see under II. 2. c.
218. Peral, see note 93, 4-5.
219. See note 217, paras 2 and 3.
220. International Crisis Group, see note 110, 11.
221. Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Doc. S/2004/698 of 30 August 2004, paras 1 and 13.
222. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Doc. S/2004/908 of 18 November 2004, paras 34 and 35.
223. Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, Doc. S/2004/300 of 16 April 2004, paras 2 and 20.
224. S/RES/1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, para. 7 (I-III).
225. S/RES/1576 (2004) of 29 November 2004, para. 2.
226. See note 226, para. 4.
227. See note 224, para. 25. The HICF applied from 2004 to 2006. In 2006 the new government of Haiti prolonged the HICF until 2007. A consensus document, agreed by the international donor community and Haitian actors, exclusively Fanmi Lavalas.
228. See note 227, para. 7 I (d).
229. See note 227, para. 7 II (a).
230. See note 231.
231. S/RES/1658 (2006) of 14 February 2006.
232. See note 227, para. 7 I (b).
233. S/RES/1608 (2005) of 22 June 2005.
234. See note 227. Additionally, a Core Group of all relevant actors and an ad hoc group of the ECOSOC were established in order to improve the coordination of external actors in Haiti. See note 225, para. 47.
235. S/RES/1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004.
236. See note 240, para. 1; S/RES/1576 (2004) of 29 November 2004, para. 1 and S/RES/1601 (2005) of 31 May 2005, para. 1.
237. S/RES/1658 (2006) of 14 February 2006, para. 1.
238. Peral, see note 93, 2.
239. See under II. 2. b.
240. M. Aguirre, The United Nations and Spain in Haiti, 2006, Working Paper of FRIDE, available at: , 2.
241. International Crisis Group, Spoiling Security in Haiti?, Latin American Caribbean Report No. 13 of 31 May 2005, 19.
242. See note 227, para. 4.
243. S/RES/1608 (2005) of 22 June 2005, para. 2.
244. International Crisis Group, Haiti's Elections: The Case for a Short Delay?, Latin American Caribbean Report No. 9 of 25 November 2005, 3-4.
245. See note 225, para. 65.
246. Ibid., para. 4, para. 5 and para. 65.
247. Report of the Security Council Mission to Haiti, 13 to 16 April, Doc. S/2005/302 of 6 May 2005, para. 4.
248. Although the Transitional Government insisted that the army issue should be addressed by a legitimate elected government, it had announced compensation paying for former soldiers. But due to unavailable resources payments could not be made. See International Crisis Group, see note 147, 5-7.
249. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Doc. S/2006/60 of 2 February 2006, para. 26-27;
250. International Crisis Group, see note 147.
251. Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States Concerning Electoral Assistance to Haiti of 3 November 2004.
252. International Crisis Group, see note 251, 6.
253. Here, only activities of peace-keeping measures are taken into account. Whereas, it must be stated meanwhile UNDP has undertaken various efforts in order to promote democracy in Haiti.
254. See under III. 3. d. in this article.
255. See note 113.
256. D. Wolter/J. Möller, “The United Nations at Sixty: Getting Serious with Conflict Prevention”, Friedens-Warte 80 (2005), 333 et seq. (335).
257. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Why Democracy is an International Issue, Lecture at Oxford University, Doc. SG/SM/7850 of 19 June 2001.
258. Besides electoral assistance local authorities and institutions shall be supported, particularly, on the local level. Altogether the support of democratic governance plays a subordinate role in the current formulation of MINUSTAH's mandate. Instead the Secretary-General identifies two main areas for its work. First, support of institutions of rule of law and state administration. Second, ensuring a secure and stable environment as well as police and justice/prisons system support; cf. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Doc. S/2006/592 of 28 July 2006, paras 44 and 45 and 77-80. The Security Council recently extended MINUSTAH's mandate until the 15 February 2007, S/RES/1702 (2006) of 15 August 2006.