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Volumn 22, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 499-508

Governance transformations through regulations in the electricity sector: The Dutch case

Author keywords

Electricity industries; Liberalization; Regulation; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

COMPETITIVENESS; CONFERENCE PROCEEDING; ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; EUROPEAN COMMISSION; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; LIBERALIZATION; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK;

EID: 46249083263     PISSN: 02692171     EISSN: 14653486     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02692170802137695     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (2)

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