Nihil novum sub sole since the South West Africa cases? On ius standi, the ICJ and community interests

International Community Law Review

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 171-197

  De La Rasilla Del Moral, Ignacio ^a,b  

^a GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSIDAD PABLO DE OLAVIDE   (Spain)

Author keywords

Actio popularis; Community interest; Erga omnes; International Court of Justice; Ius standi; Jus cogens

Indexed keywords

EID: 46149124781     PISSN: 18719740     EISSN: 18719732     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/187197308X311290     Document Type: Review

References (203)

1. V.D.Degan, Sources of International Law, (1997) p. 220.
2. Henry J Steiner and Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics and Morals, (2nd ed., 2000) p. 138.
3. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, "Judicial Insights into Fundamental Values and Interests of the International Commnity" in A.S. Muller et al. (eds.), The International Court of Justice: Its Future Role after Fifty Years (1997), pp. 327-366, 364.
4. See also: Catherine Maia, "Le Juge international au coeur du dévoilement du droit impératif: entre nécessité et prudence", 83 Revue de droit international de sciences diplomatiques et politiques 1 (2005), pp. 1-35.
5. For the use of the expression «international community» by the ICJ, one can e.g. consult Don Greig's survey of the meaning of the expressions "interdependence" and "international community" in judicial and UN practice in Don Greig, "'International Community', 'Interdependence' and 'All That . . .' Rhetorical Correctness" in Gerard Kreijen (Ed.in chief ) State Sovereignty and International Governance (2002, repr. 2004), pp. 521-603, 546-555.
6. Christian Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.) The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order, (2006).
7. For a brief overview of some developments at other jurisdictional levels, see: Paul Tavernier "L'identification des règles fondamentales, un problème résolu?" in C. Tomuschat and J-M. Thouvenin (eds.) (note 4, supra), pp. 1-20.
8. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judgement of 3 February 2006, International Court of Justice, General List. No.126.
9. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi), Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 23 June 1999, International Court of Justice General List. No.115.
10. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 23 June 1999, International Court of Justice General List. No.116.
11. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 23 June 1999, International Court of Justice General List. No.117.
12. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) Judgment of 19 December 2005, para. 26. It is also worthwhile noting the Court's statement in the same paragraph as it can be made extensible to the Judgement of February 2006 "The Court is aware, too, that the factional conflicts within the DRC require a comprehensive settlement to the problems of the region. However, the task of the Court must be to respond, on the basis of international law, to the particular legal dispute brought before it. As it interprets and applies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task cannot go beyond that".
13. The Great Lakes region has been in profound turmoil for almost two decades, this has been the object of very diverse readings among which see, e.g. for a first background chronological picture of the conflict and pinpointing of the diverse sociological phenomena involved: Reyntjens, Filip, "The Privatisation and Criminalization of Public Space in the Geopolitics of the Great Lakes Region", Journal of Modern African Studies, 43, 4 (2005), pp. 587-607;
14. See, also, introductorily, as seen in terms of US'-France geo-strategical competition e.g. Huliaras, Asteris, C., The J. of Modern African Studies, 43, 4 (2005), pp. 587-607.
15. "Anglosaxon conspiracy": French perceptions of the Great Lakes crisis" The Journal of Modern African Studies, 36, 4 (1998), pp. 593-609.
16. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Declaration of Judge Elaraby, para. 2.
17. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Application instituting proceedings filed in the Registry of the Court on 23 June 1999, International Court of Justice General List. No.117 The DRC founds the jurisdiction of the Court on the declarations made by the two States under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute.
18. See, among different reactions, e.g. Kammerhofer, Jörg, The Armed Activities Case and Non-state Actors in Self-Defence Law, 20 Leiden Journal of International Law (2007), pp. 89-113.
19. See, also, Christian Tams, "Note Analytique-Swimming with the Tide or Seeking to Stem it? Recent ICJ Rulings on the Law of Self-Defence" 18 Révue québécoise de droit international (2005).
20. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Burundi), Order of 30 January 2001, International Court of Justice, General List. No.115.
21. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Order of 30 January 2001, International Court of Justice, General List. No.117.
22. Article 22 of the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 29.1 of the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Article IX of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; Article 75 of the 1946 Constitution of the World Health Organization; Article XIV.2 of the 1945 Constitution of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation; Article 9 of the 1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies; Article 30.1 of the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Article 14 of the 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of the Civil Aviation. An additional basis of jurisdiction invoked was Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
23. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) International Court of Justice Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, General List, No.126 Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Dugard, para.12.
24. For the question of what the author terms "the fundamental division among the judges as to the role of the Court in cases involving the use of force" and the problematic contextual relation of the Court with the Security Council in this area through an analysis of case law, including analysis of the provisional measures phase of both Armed Activities cases, see, Gray, Christine "The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases concerning the Use of Force after Nicaragua" European Journal of International Law (2003), Vol. 14 No. 5, 867-905.
25. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) International Court of Justice Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, General List, No.126 paras. 89 and 91.
26. See, e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, "The Concept of International judicial Jurisdiction: A reappraisal" 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2003, pp. 501-550.
27. Ruiz Fabri & Sorel (op.cit, note 27), 989.
28. See: Daniel Muller, "Procedural Developments at the International Court of Justice", 5 The Law and Practice of the International Courts and Tribunals, (2006), p. 310.
29. See e.g. Separate Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh stressing his serious doubts regarding some elements in the Court's reasoning leading to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction under Article 29 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. See also Declaration of Judge Kooijmans on "the appropriateness of one of the elements of the Court's conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction under Article 29, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women".
30. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), paras. 39-55.
31. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), paras. 64-70 and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) International Court of Justice Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, General List, No.126, paras. 71-72.
32. See Weckel (op.cit., note 7), 492.
33. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Declaration of Judge Elaraby, paras. 17-19.
34. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6) para. 68: "In fact, the Court has already had occasion in the past to give effect to such reservations to Article IX of the Convention (see Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 772, paras. 32-33;
35. Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. United States of America), Provisional Measures, Order of 2 June 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 924, paras. 24-25).
36. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, para.16.
37. For a detailed analysis, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), International Court of Justice, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judgement of 3 February 2006, 55 International Comparative Law Quarterly, (2006), pp. 753-763, 762.
38. Ibid.
39. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, para. 6.
40. Orakhelashvili, (op.cit. note 66), 759.
41. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, para. 13.
42. Orakhelashvili, (op.cit. note 66), 759.
43. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, para. 24 "The allegation involving the commission of genocide is far too serious a matter to be allowed to escape judicial scrutiny by means of a procedural device".
44. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, para. 1.
45. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Declaration of Judge Elaraby, para. 10. It should be recalled that Judge Elabary was the only judge (beyond the judge ad-hoc ) to vote against the rejection of the request for the indication of provisional measures, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) International Court of Justice Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, General List, No.126. Declaration of Judge Elabary.
46. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, para. 25.
47. Ibid. para. 25.
48. Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1951, 4.
49. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, para. 13.
50. Ibid. para. 16.
51. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Joint Separate Opinion by Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, para. 29.
52. See Weckel (op.cit., note 7) 490.
53. Ruiz Fabri & Sorel (op.cit, note 27), 995.
54. Higgins, Rosalyn, "Human Rights in the International Court of Justice", Leiden Journal of International Law, 20 (2007), pp. 745-751.
55. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), pp. 52-53, para. 127 in reference to the prohibition of genocide An implicit admittance on the characterisation of the prohibition of racial discrimination as a peremptory norm of international law could, furthermore, be read in paragraph 78. For an interpretation built on the to non-qualification of racial discrimination as a norm of jus cogens by the Court, see Philippe Weckel (& as collaborator Guillaume Areou), Chronique de jurisprudence international, 2 Revue générale de droit international public (2006), pp. 487-494, 489.
56. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), International Court of Justice, Judgement of 24 May 1980, General List No.64, para. 88.
57. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, International Court of Justice, General List No.95, para. 79.
58. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, International Court of Justice, General List No.131, para. 157.
59. Andreas L. Paulus "Jus cogens in a Time of a Hegemony and Fragmentation. An Attempt at a Reappraisal, 74 Nordic Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 297-334, 307.
60. C. Maia (op.cit., note 3), p. 4.
61. See historically e.g., Correa Baptista, Eduardo, Jus cogens em Direito International, 1997. This author consecrates more than 250 pages to an historical-legal analysis of the concept, beginning at the year 1453. For an overview, see: Michael Byers, "Reconceptualising the Relationship between Jus cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 Nordic Journal of International Law (1997) pp. 211-239, 213-219 with extensive bibliography.
62. For a further list of selected readings, see, e.g. Mauricio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, (1997) p. 43.The most recent and comprehensive work on the jus cogens is: Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (2006).
63. The Oscar Chinn case (United Kingdom v. Belgium), 1934 PCIJ (Ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149 (Judge Schücking, Separate Opinión).
64. Judge Alvarez's "new international law" emphasised the lawmaking power of the Court, the legal interpretation in the light of the facts of social life itself and the interdependence of states now forming a community with common general interests etc. See further: Katharina Zobel, Judge Alejandro Álvarez at the International Court of Justice (1946-1955): His Theory of a "New International Law" and Judicial Lawmaking, 19 Leiden Journal of International Law (2006), pp. 1017-1040. See also V. Gowlland-Debbas (note 3, supra), 327.
65. For an exhaustive list, see Mauricio Ragazzi (note 14, supra), p. 46, footnote 12.
66. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v.Thailand), Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 26 May 1961: I.C.J. Reports 1961, p. 34 (in the English authoritative version, the term used is "mandatory").
67. North Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/ Netherlands), International Court of Justice, Judgement of 20 February 1969, General List Nos.51&52, para. 72.
68. ème siècle : le régard d'un juge (2003), pp. 189-209.
69. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgement of 27 June 1986, International Court of Justice, General List No.70, para. 190.
70. Ibid. The possibility of interpreting the existence of an exception to jurisdiction via peremptory norms in the Court's finding of jurisdiction in the Nicaragua Case has been recently hinted at by Ruffert, Matthias, "Special Jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Case of Infringements of Fundamental Rules International Legal Order?" in C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order, (2006), pp. 295-310,298-299.
71. In similar sense, see the reaction to the Nicaragua Judgement in A. Gordon Christenson, "The World Court and jus cogens", 87 American Journal of International Law, Vol.81, pp. 93-101.
72. See: (United States of America v. Iran)(note 8) para. 79.
73. Even if it noted that "the question whether a norm is part of the jus cogens relates to the legal character of the norm" - See: Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, (note 10) para. 83.
74. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgement of 25 September 1997, International Court of Justice, General List No.92, para.112 "Neither of the Parties contended that new peremptorv norms of environmental law had emerged since the conclusion of the 1977 Treaty, and the Court will consequently not be required to examine the scope of Article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties".
75. Andrea Bianchi, 'Dismantling the Wall: the ICJ's Advisory Opinion and Its Likely Impact on International Law', 47 German Yearbook of International Law (2004), pp. 343-391, 383-386.
76. R. Rivier, Droit impératif et jurisdiction internationale, thèse pour l'obtention du Doctorat du droit public, Université de Paris II, 2001, p. 504, quoted by Maia, (op.cit. note 3) note 14.
77. Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Jean-Marc Sorel «Chronique de jurisprudence de la cour internationale de justice (2006)» 3 Journal du Droit international (2007), pp. 989-996.
78. See Weckel (op.cit., note 7).
79. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), para. 64: "The same applies to the relationship between peremptory norms of general international law (jus cogens) and the establishment of the Court's jurisdiction: the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm having such a character, which is assuredly the case with regard to the prohibition of genocide, cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain that dispute. Under the Court's Statute that jurisdiction is always based on the consent of the parties". See further: Higgins, Rosalyn "A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench" 55 International Comparative Law Quarterly, (2006), pp. 791-804, 800-801.
80. Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), International Court of Justice ,Judgment of 30 June 1995, General List No.84, para. 29 "However, the Court considers that the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things. Whatever the nature of the obligations invoked, the Court could not rule on the lawfulness of the conduct of a State when its judgement would imply an evaluation of the lawfulness of the conduct of another State which is not a party to the case. Where this is so, the Court cannot act, even if the right in question is a right erga omnes". See: Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), 186.
81. Against this interpretation, see Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), para. 64: "The Court observes, however, as it has already had occasion to emphasise, that "the erga omnes character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction are two different things" (East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, p. 102, para. 29), and that the mere fact that rights and obligations erga omnes may be at issue in a dispute would not give the Court jurisdiction to entertain that dispute".
82. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda) International Court of Justice Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Order of 10 July 2002, General List, No.126 Para. 71.
83. See: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (note 7), paras. 147 and 148, 2007.
84. As stressed by Judge Elaraby. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Declaration of Judge Elaraby para. 9.
85. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (1994), 221-384, 298.
86. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), para. 69.
87. For a different analysis of this aspect, see José Antonio Quindimil López "Las normas de ius cogens y el consentimiento de los Estados ante la Corte Internacional de Justicia: ¿hacia un nuevo fundamento de jurisdicción?" (Comentarios sobre la sentencia de la Corte Internacional de Justicia de 3 de febrero de 2006, actividades armadas sobre el territorio del Congo, República Democrática del Congo contra Ruanda - nueva demanda de 2002 -)" 12 Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales (2006), pp. 1-17.
88. Nicholas Tsagourias, "The Will of the International Community as a Normative Source of International Law" in Governance and International Legal Theory, ed. by Ige F. Dekker and Wouter G. Werner, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004, pp. 97-121, 110-111.
89. Markus Benzig "Community Interests in the Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals" 2 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2006), pp. 269-324.
90. Nicholas Tsagourias, "The Will of the International Community as a Normative Source of International Law" in Governance and International Legal Theory, ed. by Ige F. Dekker and Wouter G. Werner, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2004, pp. 97-121, 110-111.
91. See, e.g Bardo Fassbender, "The Meaning of International Constitutional Law" in Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community, R.St-.J. Macdonald and D.M. Johnston (eds), Nijhoff Publishers, 2005, pp. 837-51.
92. Martti Koskenniemi, "International Law and Hegemony: A Reconfiguration" 17 Cambridge Review of International Affairs (2004), pp. 197-218.
93. Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, "Cultural Relativism the American Way: The Nationalist School of International Law in the United States" 5 Global Jurist (2005), pp. 1-166.
94. See: Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, International Law Commission, fifty-eight session, UN General Assembly, A/ CN.4/ L.682, 4 April 2006, specially, pp. 152-173.
95. Hans J. Morgenthau, "Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law" 34 The American Journal of International Law, No. 2 (Apr., 1940), pp. 260-284.
96. Case Concerning the Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. United Kingdom) Preliminary Objections, Judgement of 2 December 1963, ICJ Reports 1963, p. 15.
97. See: Thirlway, Hugh, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960-1989" Part One, in British Year Book of International Law (1989), 80-81.
98. See: Cameroon v. United Kingdom (note 47) pp. 33-34.
99. See: Christian J. Tams's book review of «Francois Voeffray, L'actio popularis ou la défense de l'intérêt collectif devant les jurisdictions internationales. Publications de l'Institut Universitaire de hautes études internationales. Genève, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2004, xxii+403 and Santiago Villalpando, L'emergence de la communauté internationale dans la responsabilité des Etats,. Publications de l'Institut Universitaire de hautes études internationales. Genève, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2004, xxii+525» in German Yearbook of International Law 48 (2005), pp. 723-728, 725.
100. Abi-Saab, Georges, Cours général de droit international, Recueil des Cours Académie de Droit International, vol. 207, (1987), 256.
101. See: A /RES/ 1142 A (XII) 25 October 1957 and A/RES/ 1361 (XIV) 17 November 1959.
102. In a nutshell, the first Advisory Opinion (1950) affirmed that despite the dissolution of the League of nations, South-West Africa remained a mandate territory under the control of the UN. The advisory Opinions of 1954 and 1955 precised the modalities of the exercise of that control. See respectively; International Status of South-West Africa, Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1950, p. 128;
103. South-West Africa - Voting Procedure, Advisory Opinion of June 7th, 1955: ICJ Reports 1955, p. 67;
104. Admissibility of hearings of petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, Advisory Opinion of June 1st, 1956: ICJ Reports 1956, p. 23.
105. See: Francois Voeffray, L'actio popularis ou la défense de l'intérêt collectif devant les jurisdictions internationales (2004), 66-68.
106. See: South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) Second Phase, Judgment of 18 July 1966, International Court of Justice, General List, Nos. 46&47 p. 18., para. 4. " . . . there was one matter that appertained to the merits of the case but which had an antecedent character . . .".
107. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) Preliminary Objections, Judgment of 21 December 1962, International Court of Justic,e General List, Nos. 46&47.
108. See: Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa (1966), para. 16.
109. Ibid., paras. 11,14, 15 and 32, 33 and 34.
110. Ibid. para. 63.
111. See specially: Francois Voeffray, L'actio popularis ou la défense de l'intérêt collectif devant les jurisdictions internationales (2004).
112. See Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa (1966), from para. 41 onwards.
113. A well established contemporary doctrinal trend disavows this view, see, e.g. Voeffray «le postulat de l'arrêt du Sud-Ouest africain selon lequel il existerait une règle générale de procédure prohibant expressément l'action populaire ne résiste pas à un examen sérieux» F. Voeffray op.cit. (note 60) p. 331.
114. See: Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa (1966), para. 88.
115. See: Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), 68, 63-69.
116. See: Santiago Villalpando, L'émergence de la communauté internationale dans la responsabilité des Etats (2005), 285.
117. For an analysis of the PCIJ's jurisprudence in this respect, see: F. Voeffray, op.cit. (note 60), 47-54.
118. Ibid., 55.
119. See: Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa (1966), para. 40 "The Court simply holds that such rights or interests, in order to exist, must be clearly vested in those who claim them, by some text or instrument, or rule of law" See, also: para. 48 in fine.
120. Brigitte Bollecker-Stern, Le préjudice dans la théorie de la responsabilité internationale, (1973), 50.
121. Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (1994), 221-384, 298.
122. See anticipating the different possibilities available to the Court, Christine Chinkin "East Timor Moves into the World Court" 4 European Journal of International Law 2 (1993).
123. Robert Kolb, Théorie d'jus cogens international. Essai du relecture du concept, (2001), 325.
124. C. Tams, op.cit. (note 64), 161.
125. Remarkably enough, C. Tams op.cit. (note 64) concludes his exhaustive analysis (pp. 158-197) by noting "To sum up, there is, within the spectre of heterogeneous views expressed since 1970, a marked tendency to take the Barcelona Traction dictum at face value, and to accept that all states have standing in disputes involving breaches of obligations erga omnes" at p. 192. See, complementarily, Christian Tomuschat's book review of Tam's work in 48 German Yearbook of International Law, (2005), pp. 720-723.
126. C. Tams op.cit. (note 64), 197.
127. Jean-Marc Thouvenin «La saisine de la Cour internationale de Justice en cas de violation des règles fondamentales de l'ordre juridique international» in C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thounevin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order (2006), pp. 311-334.
128. F. Voeffray, op.cit. (note 60), 321.
129. See: Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (2006).
130. Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), p. 26, For the notion of standing and the 3 basic features of the rules of standing, otherwise their normativity, their flexibility and diversity see, pp. 25-40. See, also, interestingly, the impact of the structural analysis of multilateral obligation on the rules of standing - understood as a regime that was not static but in a state of tension - before the arrival of the erga omnes concept, pp. 53-63.
131. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1951, p. 23. The Court noted that "the principles underlying the convention are principles which are recognised by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation".
132. See: Santiago Villalpando, L'emergence de la communauté internationale dans la responsabilité des Etats (2004, 286; also noted by Theodor Meron, International Law in the Age of Human Rights, 301 Recueil des Cours de l'Academie de Droit International (2003), 263.
133. See: Article 48. paragraph 1 (a) and Commentary (note 7) in Crawford, James, The International
134. Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002). 122) See: Article 42 paragraph (b) (ii) and Commentary (note 13) in Crawford, J., op.cit. (note 23).
135. See: V. Gowlland-Debbas, op.cit. (note 3) at 351.
136. See: Shabtai Rosenne, The Perplexities of Modern International Law, 291 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International (2001), 230-232.
137. See: Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), Second phase, International Court of Justice, Judgement of 5 February, 1970, General List, No.50, paras. 34-35.
138. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinión, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 22.
139. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), para. 66.
140. See: Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (note 7), para. 161.
141. For a contrary position of those who have highlighted the gratuity of the dictum "as far as specific considerations relating to the Barcelona Traction case are concerned" Mauricio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, (1997) p. 11.
142. For an analysis of the effects of the distinction between obiter dictum and ratio decidendi in international law, see Ragazzi op.cit (note 88), 1-17.
143. The excerpt from Schachter's Course is referred in Robert Kolb, Les cours généraux de droit international public de l'Académie de la Haye (2003), 695 e.g. "It was generally surmised that this dictum was the judges' response to the criticism of the earlier decision".
144. For an analysis of how the Barcelona Traction case disavowed South-West Africa judgement and upheld the actio popularis, see Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law, (2006), 518-529.
145. See: Voeffray, F., op.cit. (note 54) at 71-72 and 75. See also Ragazzi op.cit. (note 88), 8, quoting different authority sources.
146. See: B. Simma, op.cit (note 70), 293.
147. See: Christian, Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will , 241 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (1993), 236.
148. Juan-Antonio Carrillo-Salcedo, Book Review of the Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes by M. Ragazzi, 92 The American Journal of International Law, 4 (1998), pp. 791-793.
149. For an analysis of the what the author terms. "Selected prefigurations of the concept of obligations erga omnes", see, again, Ragazzi op.cit. (note 88), 18-42.
150. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1951, p. 23.
151. As noted by Juan Antonio Carrillo-Salcedo, "Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law" 8 European Journal of International Law, 4 (1997) pp. 583-596 in its advisory opinion of 11 April
152. Referred by Ragazzi under the term "elementary considerations of humanity" as a concept functionally equivalent to "erga omnes" M. Ragazzi, op.cit. (note 88), 85-86.
153. For a detailed commentary of each of the elements, see Mauricio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, (1997) pp. 74-131 M.
154. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962) (Belgium v. Spain), Second phase, International Court of Justice, Judgement of 5 February, 1970, General List, No.50, para. 34.
155. See: Simma, B. op.cit. (note 470), 295.
156. See: H. Thirlway. op.cit. (note 48), 100.
157. See introductorily James Crawford The International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility. Introduction, Text and Commentaries (2002), pp. 276-280.
158. See, further: Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, "Kant, Hobbes and the Likely Impact of the ILC's Articles on State Responsibility", 11 Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales (2006), pp. 1-18.
159. See e.g. among the different commentaries to the UN Charter, Anne Thide Norodom, "Article 13. 1 a)", Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire Article par Article (J.P. Cot et al.) (2005, 3rd ed), 699-721.
160. On the distinction between lege data and lege ferenda, it is always worthwhile revisiting Michel Virally, "A propos de la "lege ferenda" in Michel Virally, Le droit international en devenir: essais écrits au fils du temps, 1990, pp. 213-223.
161. See introductorily J. Crawford op.cit. (note 104), 302-305.
162. Mauricio Ragazzi, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, (1997), 218.
163. See: Theodor Meron, International Law in the Age of Human Rights, 301 Recueil des Cours de l'Academie de Droit International (2003), 259.
164. See: Georges Abi-Saab, "The Uses of Article 19", 10 European Journal of International Law 2 (1999) pp. 339-351.
165. The exact excerpt of professor Virally's Course is referred in Kolb, Robert, Les cours généraux de droit international public de l'Académie de la Haye, (2003), 719.
166. S.S. Lotus case (France v. Turkey), 1927 PCIJ (Ser.A) No.10, at 19: "international law governs relations between independent states. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions and by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law".
167. Christian Tomuschat, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against their Will, 241 Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law (1993).
168. See: V. Gowlland-Debbas, op.cit. (note 3) at 327.
169. See: Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa (note 55) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka.
170. See: Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L'unité de l'ordre juridique international, Cours général de droit international public (2000) 297 Recueil des Cours, Deuxième partie, Chapître II, 245-269 (2002).
171. J. Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1968, pp. 72-3, 75.
172. Robert Kolb, Théorie du jus cogens international. Essay du relecture du concept, 2001, p. 59. Kolb develops his Herculean effort of systematisation in pp. 59-168.
173. Ibid. p. 76. On «Le ius cogens comme règle axiologique d'une communauté: la thèorie de l'ordre public international», See, pp. 68-82.
174. More specifically, e.g. Dupuy's reference can be assimilated within this author's analysis within the framework of "l'ordre public comme ordre juridique (institutionalise) de la communauté internationale" and within as an instance of what Kolb defines as the doctrinal trend of la "communaute nécessaire", pp. 78-79.
175. Ibid., see pp. 33-58.
176. Also specifically dealt with by Villalpando in his analysis of the legal debate on emergence of the international community; see: Santiago Villalpando, L'émergence de la communauté internationale dans la responsabilité des Etats (2005), 42-74.
177. Prosper Weil, "Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?" 77 American Journal of International Law, (1983), 413-442 at 442.
178. Andreas L. Paulus "Jus cogens in a Time of a Hegemony and Fragmentation. An Attempt at a Reappraisal, 74 Nordic Journal of International Law (2005) pp. 297-334, 333.
179. See e.g. Nicholas Tsagourias (ed.) Transnational Constitutionalism: International Law and European Perspectives, 2007.
180. Vera Gowlland-Debbas, op.cit. (note 3), 351. For a full appreciation of the connoted view of this author, read, however, 351-366.
181. Christian J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005), 186.
182. See: Rosenne, Shabtai, The Perplexities of Modern International Law, 291 Recueil des Cours Academie de Droit International (2001), 403.
183. Ruffert, Matthias, "Special Jurisdiction of the ICJ in the Case of Infringements of Fundamental Rules International Legal Order?" in C. Tomuschat and J.-M. Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order, pp. 295-310 (2006), 310.
184. See, nonetheless, of course, S. Rosenne noting that "the principle that the jurisdiction of an international tribunal derives from the consent of the parties has long been subject to a process of refinement ( . . .). The result is that the principle is less rigid than may be inferred from the manner in which it is enunciated", Shabtai Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice, 1920-1955, Volume II, Jurisdiction, (2006), 555.
185. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, Judgement of 3 February 2006, International Court of Justice, General List. No. 126.
186. See Philippe Weckel (& as collaborator Guillaume Areou), Chronique de jurisprudence international, 2 Revue générale de droit international public (2006), pp. 487-494, 492.
187. Markus Benzig "Community Interests in the Procedure of International Courts and Tribunals" 2 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (2006), pp. 269-324.
188. M. Ruffert (note 127), 299.
189. Ibid.
190. M. Ruffert (note 127), 307.
191. M. Ruffert argues "It is submitted that the Security Council could overcome the requirement of consent by issuing a binding decision against the party to a dispute that has not made its declaration under article 36 (2) Statute" and consecrates his attention to analyse counter-arguments and obstacles to that submission. See: M. Ruffert op.cit. (note 127), pp. 307-310. For a reference to the Corfu Channel case as an example of a liberal interpretation of the requirement of consent when influenced by an action of an organ of the UN as the SC, see M. Rosenne op.cit. (note 128), 556-557.
192. J.-M. Thouvevin, op.cit. (note 125), 322.
193. Ibid., 332.
194. See: Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda (note 6), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, para. 25.
195. See: S. Rosenne (note 128) and his analysis of forum prorrogatum in pp. 672-699.
196. See Ruiz Fabri and Sorel (op.cit., note 27) p. 988 in reference to two recent cases in which France has given its consent to a procedure so initiated as «il s'agit ni plus ni moins des deux seuls exemples d'acceptation de cette procedure dépuis la création de la Cour».
197. See: Duncan Kennedy, "Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought : 1850-2000" The New Law and Economic Development (D.M. Trubek & A. Santos, Eds.) (2006) pp. 19-73.
198. James Crawford, "Democracy and the Body of international law" en Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds).Democratic Governance and International Law, 2000, at 97.
199. Abi-Saab, Georges, Cours général de droit international, Recueil des Cours Académie de Droit International, vol. 207, (1987), 322. For this author "Ce n'est pas une division selon l'objet de la réglementation, mais selon la manière dont on procède à cette réglamentation".
200. Christian Tomuschat, "Article 36", The Statute of the International Court of Justice: a Commentary (A. Zimmerman et al. Eds.) (2006), pp. 590-657, 603: "It is therefore unavoidable that developments should take place cautiously step by step".
201. See: International Community Law Review's Special Issue on "the International Court of Justice and Non-State Actors" Vol. 9, No.2 (2007).
202. A relevant extract from the Spanish Constitution of 1978 is worth noting as exemplary of the present state of affairs: Art. 87. 3 "An organic act shall lay down the manner and the requirements of the popular initiative for submission of non-governmental bills. In any case, no less than 500.000 authenticated signatures shall be required. This initiative shall not be allowed on matters concerning organic acts, taxation, international affairs or the prerogative of pardon".
203. Pedro Calderón de la Barca, La vida es sueño (1636), Acto II, escena 19. Segismundo's monologue. Although it cannot be compared to the 17th Spanish original classic, a translation into the contemporary lingua franca would say approximately like this: "Dreams the rich man of riches and fears,/ The fears that his riches breed/The poor man dreams of his need,/And all his sorrows and tears;/Dreams he that prospers with years,/Dreams he that feigns and foregoes,/ Dreams he that rails on his foes/; And in all the world, I see,/ Man dreams whatever he be,/ And his own dream no man knows./ And I too dream and behold./ I dream I am bound with chains,/ And I dreamed that these present pains/ Were fortunate ways of old./ What is life? a tale that is told; /What is life? a frenzy extreme, /A shadow of things that seem;/ And the greatest good is but small,/ That all life is a dream to all,/ And that dreams themselves are a dream". Translated by Arthur Symons in Hispanic Anthology: Poems Translated from the Spanish by English and North American Poets. Ed. Thomas Walsh. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1920.