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Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 161-178

Rational lobbying and EU climate policy

Author keywords

Climate policy; European Union; Interest groups; Lobbying

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; EUROPEAN UNION; MODEL; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK;

EID: 45849086133     PISSN: 15679764     EISSN: 15731553     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10784-008-9067-5     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (31)

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