Incentives and coordination in vertically related energy markets

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 67, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 381-393

  Micola, Augusto Rupérez ^a   Banal Estañol, Albert ^b   Bunn, Derek W ^c  

^a DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS   (Spain)

^b CITY UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agent based modelling; Energy markets; Reward interdependence

Indexed keywords

EID: 45449106140     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.12.007     Document Type: Article

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