Federalism and conflicts over principalship. Some insights into the American constitutional history

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 281-304

  Josselin, Jean Michael ^a   Marciano, Alain ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE RENNES 1   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE REIMS CHAMPAGNE ARDENNE   (France)

Author keywords

agency theory; American constitutional history; federalism; strategic behavior

Indexed keywords

EID: 4544258539     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:COPE.0000040433.37364.3e     Document Type: Review

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