FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 16, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 315-327

  Frey, Bruno S ^a   Eichenberger, Reiner ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030240219     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0144-8188(96)00019-1     Document Type: Article

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