From ambiguity aversion to attitudes towards ambiguity: Contributions of a psychological perspective to economics;De l'aversion à l'ambiguïté aux attitudes face à l'ambiguïté les apports d'une perspective psychologique en économie

Revue Economique

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 259-280

  Cabantous, Laure ^a   Hilton, Denis ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOULOUSE CAPITOLE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ TOULOUSE JEAN JAURÈS   (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 45349105264     PISSN: 00352764     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3917/reco.572.0259     Document Type: Article

References (106)

1. ABDELLAOUI M. [2000], « Parameter-free elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions », Management Science, 46 (11), p. 1497-1512.
2. BLACK M. [1937], « Vagueness: an exercise in logical analysis », Philosophy of Science, 4, p. 427-455.
3. BECKER S. et BROWNSON F. [1964], « What price ambiguity? or the role of ambiguity in decision-making », The Journal of Political Economy, 72, p. 62-73.
4. BLEICHRODT H. et LUIS PINTO K. [2000], « A parameter-free elicitation of the probability weighting function in medical decision analysis », Management Science, 46 (11), p. 1485-1496.
5. BUDESCU D. V. et WALLSTEN T. S. [1995], « Processing linguistic probabilities: general principles and empirical evidence », dans BUSEMEYER R., HASTIE R. et MEDIN D. L. (eds), Decision making from a cognitive perspective, San Diego, Academic Press, p. 275-318.
6. BUDESCU D. V., KUHN K., KRAMER K. et JOHNSON T. [2002], « Modeling certainty equivalent for imprecise gambles », Organizational Behavior and Human and Decision Processes, 88, p. 748-768.
7. BURRELL G. et MORGAN G. [1979], Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis: elements of the sociology of corporate life, Heinemann Educational Books.
8. CABANTOUS L. [2005], « Is probability weighting sensitive to the quality of the probabilistic information? An experimental investigation on the impact of vagueness and conflict on decision weights », Communication à la « 20th Research Conference on Subjective Probability, Utility, and Decision Making (spudm20) », Stockholm, 22-24 août.
9. CABANTOUS L., HILTON D. et SHANTEAU J. [2004], « Ambiguity and conflict aversion: an attributional explanation for confidence in one's judgement », Communication à la conference « Society for Judgement and Decision Making » (sjdm), Minneapolis, us, 19-22 novembre.
10. CAMERER C. F. [1992], « Recent tests of generalized utility theories. I » dans EDWARDS W. (ed.), Utility theories: Measurement and applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 207-251.
11. CAMERER C. G. et LOEWENSTEIN G. [2003], « Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future », dans CAMERER C., LOEWENSTEIN G. et RABIN M. (eds), Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton University Press.
12. CAMERER C. et WEBER M. [1992], « Recent developments in modelling preferences: uncertainty and ambiguity », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, p. 325-370.
13. CHEN Z. et EPSTEIN L. [2002], « Ambiguity, risk, and asset returns in continuous time », Econometrica, 70 (4).
14. CHOW C. et SARIN R. [2002], « Known, unknown and unknowable uncertainties », Theory and Decision, 52 (2), p. 127-138.
15. CHOW C. et SARIN R. [2001], « Comparative ignorance and the Ellsberg paradox », The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 22 (2), p. 129-139.
16. COHEN M. et TALLON J.-M. [2000], « Décision dans le risque et l'incertain: l'apport des modèles non additifs, Revue d'économie politique, 110, p. 631-681.
17. COHEN M., JAFFRAY J.-Y et SAID T. [1985], « Individual behavior under risk and uncertainty: an experimental study », Theory and Decision, 18, p. 203-228.
18. COHEN M., JAFFRAY J.-Y et SAID T. [1987], « Experimental comparison of individual behavior under risk and under uncertainty for gains and for losses », Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39 (1), p. 1-22.
19. CURLEY S. P., YATES J. F. et ABRAMS R. A. [1986], « Psychological Sources of Ambiguity Avoidance », Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 38 (2), p. 230.
20. DE FINETTI B. [1937], La prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives, Paris.
21. DEMPSTER A. P. [1967], « Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping », Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 38, p. 325-339.
22. DU N. et BUDESCU D. [2005], « The effects of imprecise probabilities and outcomes in evaluating investment options », Management Science (à paraître).
23. DUPUY J.-P. [2002], Pour un catastrophisme éclairé. Quand l'impossible est certain, Paris, Seuil.
24. EDWARDS W. [1953], « Experiments on economic decision-making in gambling situations », Econometrica, 21, p. 349-350.
25. EINHORN H. et HOGARTH R. M. [1985], « Ambiguity and uncertainty in probabilistic inference », Psychological Review, 92, p. 433-461.
26. ELLSBERG D. [1961], « Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms », The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, p. 643-669.
27. ETCHART-VINCENT N. [2004], « Is probability weighting sensitive to the magnitude of the consequence? An experimental investigation on losses? », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 28 (3), p. 217-235.
28. FENEMA H. et VAN ASSEN M. [1999], « Measuring the utility of losses by means of the tradeoff method », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 17 (3), p. 277-295.
29. FOX G. et TVERSKY A. [1995], « Ambiguity aversion and comparative ignorance », The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, p. 585-603.
30. FOX G. et WEBER M. [2002], « Ambiguity aversion, comparative ignorance and decision context », Organizational Behavior and Human and Decision Processes, 88 (1), p. 476-498.
31. FRIEDMAN M. [1953], « The Methodology of Positive Economics », dans Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago University Press.
32. FRISCH D. et BARON J. [1988], « Ambiguity and rationality », Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 1, p. 149-157.
33. GADJOS T., TALLON J.-M. et VERGNAUD J.-C. [2004], « Decision making with imprecise probabilistic information », Journal of Mathematical Economics, 40 (6), p. 647-681.
34. GHIRARDATO P. et MARINACCI M. [2002], « Ambiguity aversion made precise: a comparative foundation and some implications », Journal of Economic Theory, 102, p. 251-289.
35. GILBOA I. [2004], Uncertainty in Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of David Schmeidler's 65th Birthday, Londres, Routledge.
36. GILBOA I. et SCHMEIDLER D. [1989], « Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior », Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, p. 141-153.
37. GODARD O., HENRY C., LAGADEC P. et MICHEL-KERJAN E. [2002], Traité des nouveaux risques, GALLIMARD, inédit.
38. GOLLIER C. [2005], « Does ambiguity aversion reinforce risk aversion? Applications to portoflio choices and asset pricing », Université de Toulouse.
39. GOLLIER C. [2001], « Should we beware of the precautionary principle », Economic Policy, 16 (73), p. 359-365.
40. GOLLIER C., TREICH N. et JULLIEN B. [2000], « Scientific progress and irreversibility: an economic interpretation of the "Precautionary Principle" », Journal of Public Economics, 75, p. 229-253.
41. GONZALEZ R. et WU G. [1999], « On the shape of the probability weighting function », Cognitive Psychology, 38, p. 129-166.
42. HEATH C. et TVERSKY A. [1991], « Preference and belief: ambiguity and competence in choice under uncertainty », The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, p. 5-28.
43. HERTWIG R. et ORTMANN A. [2001], « Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists? », Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, p. 383-451.
44. HEY J. et ORME C. [1994], « Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility Theory Using Experimental data », Econometrica, 62 (6) p. 1291-1.
45. HILTON D. [2001], « Is the challenge for psychologist to return to behaviourism? », Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, p. 415-416.
46. HILTON D. J. et SLUGOSKI B. R. [1986], « Knowledge-based causal attribution: the abnormal conditions focus model », Psychological Review, 93 (1), p. 75-88.
47. HILTON D. J., SMITH R. H. et KIM S. H. [1995], « Processes of causal explanation and dispositional attribution », Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68 (3), p. 377-387.
48. HO J., KELLER L. et KELTYKA P. [2002], « Effects of outcome and probabilistic ambiguity on managerial choices », The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24 (1), p. 47-74.
49. HOGARTH R. [2001], « To what are we trying to generalize? », Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, p. 416-417.
50. HOGARTH R. M. et EINHORN H. [1990], « Venture Theory: a model of decision weights », Management Science, 36, p. 780-803.
51. HOGARTH R. M et KUNREUTHER H. [1989], « Risk, Ambiguity and Insurance », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, p. 5-35.
52. KAHNEMAN D. et TVERSKY A. [1979], « Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk », Econometrica, 47 (2), p. 263-289.
53. re éd. 1921.
54. KILKA M. et WEBER M. [2001], « What determines the shape of the probability weighting function under uncertainty? », Management Science, 47 (12), p. 1712-1726.
55. KLIBANOFF P., MARINACCI M. et MUKERJI S. [2005], « A smooth model of decision making under ambiguity », Econometrica, (à paraître).
56. KNIGHT F. [1921], Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Boston, Houghton Mifflin.
57. KUNREUTHER H., MESZAROS J., HOGARTH R. et SPRANCA M. [1995], « Ambiguity and underwriter decision processes », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 26, p. 337-352.
58. KURZBAN R. [2001], « Are experimental economists behaviorists and is behaviorism for the birds? », Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, p. 420-421.
59. LAURIOLA M. et LEVIN I. [2001], « Relating individual differences in attitude toward ambiguity to risky choice », Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14, p. 107-122.
60. LIVET P. [2001], « Action et cognition en sciences sociales », dans BERTHELOT J. M. (dir.), Epistémologie des sciences sociales, Paris, puf, p. 269-316.
61. MANGELSDORFF L. et WEBER M. [1994], « Testing Choquet expected utility », Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 25 (3), p. 437-458.
62. MARKMAN A. [2001], « Choice output and choice processing: an analogy to similarity », Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, p. 423-424.
63. MCCLOSKEY D. [1985], The Rhetoric of Economics, The University of Wisconsin Press.
64. MONGIN P. [2003], « L'axiomatisation et les théories économiques », Revue économique, 54 (1) p. 99-138.
65. MONGIN P. [2004], « L'axiomatisation et les théories économiques. Réponses aux critiques », Revue économique, 55 (1), p. 147-152.
66. MUKERJI S. [1998], « Ambiguity aversion and incompleteness of contractual form », The American Economic Review, 88 (5), p. 1207.
67. MUKERJI S. et TALLON J.-M. [2001], « Ambiguity aversion and imcompleteness of financial markets », The Review of Economic Studies, 68 (237), p. 883.
68. MULLAINATHAN S. et THALER R. [2005], « Behavioral Economics », dans International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Paris, Elsevier.
69. PAYNE J. W., BETTMAN J. R. et JOHNSON E. J. [1993], The Adaptive Decision Maker, Cambridge University Press.
70. RABIN M. [1998], « Psychology and Economics », Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1), p. 11-46.
71. RAMSEY F. [1931], « Truth and probability », dans RAMSEY F., The Foundation of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co.
72. RAUFASTE E., da SILVA NEVES R. et MARINÉ C. [2003], « Testing the descriptive validity of possibility theory in human judgments of uncertainty », Artificial Intelligence, 148, p. 197-218.
73. RODE C., COSMIDES L., HELL W. et TOOBY J. [1999], « When and why do people avoid unknown probabilities in decision under uncertainty? Testing some prediction from optimal foraging theory », Cognition, 72, p. 269-304.
74. RUSTICHINI A., DICKHAUT J., GHIRADARTO P., SMITH K. et PARDO J. [2002], « A brain imaging study of procedural choice », Working Paper.
75. SARIN R. K. et WINKLER R. L. [1992], « Ambiguity and decision modeling: a preferencebased approach », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, p. 389-407.
76. SAVAGE L. [1954], The foundations of statistics, New York, Dover.
77. SCHMEIDLER D. [1989], « Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity », Econometrica, 57 (3), p. 571-587.
78. SCHMIDT Ch. [1996], « Risk and uncertainty: a knightian distinction revisited », dans SCHMIDT Ch. (ed.), Uncertainty in Economic Thought, Londres, Edward Elgar.
79. SHAFER G. [1976], A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Princeton (NJ), Princeton University Press.
80. SHANTEAU J. [2001], « What does it mean when expert disagree? », dans SALAS E. et KLEIN G. (eds), Linking expertise and naturalistic decision making, Erlbaum.
81. SIMON H. [1990], « Invariants of human behavior », Annual Review of Psychology, 41, p. 1-19.
82. SLOVIC P. [2000], « The Construction of Preference », dans KAHNEMAN D. and TVERSKY A. (eds), Choices, Values, and Frames, Cambridge University Press., p. 489-502.
83. SLOVIC P. et TVERSKY A. [1974], « Who accepts Savage's axioms », Behavioral Science, 19, p. 368-373.
84. SMITHSON M. [1997], Human judgment and imprecise probabilities. http://ippserv. rug.ac.be.
85. SMITHSON M. [1999], « Conflict aversion: preference for ambiguity vs conflict in sources and evidence », Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79 (3), p. 179-198.
86. STARMER C. [2005], « Normative notions in descriptive dialogues », Journal of Economic Methodology, 12 (2), p. 277-289.
87. STARMER C. [2000], « Developments in non-expected utility theory: The hunt for a descriptive theory of choice under risk », Journal of Economic Literature, 38, p. 332-382.
88. SULEIMAN R. [2001], « Different perspectives of human behavior entail different experimental practices », Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, p. 429.
89. TAYLOR K. [1995], « Testing credit and blame attributions as explanation for choices under ambiguity », Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 64 (2), p. 128-137.
90. TETLOCK P. E. [1992], « The impact of accountability on judgment and choice: Toward a social contingency model », Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 24, p. 331-376, New York, Academic Press.
91. TVERSKY A. et FOX G. [1995], « Weighting risk and uncertainty », Psychological Review, 102 (2), p. 269-283.
92. TVERSKY A. et KAHNEMAN D. [1992], « Advances in prospect theory: cumulative representation of uncertainty », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, p. 297-323.
93. TVERSKY A. et KOEHLER D. [1994], « Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probability », Psychological Review, 101 (4), p. 547-567.
94. TVERSKY A. et WAKKER P. [1995], « Risk attitude and decision weights », Econometrica, 63 (6), p. 1255-1280.
95. VISCUSI K. et CHESSON H. [1999], « Hopes and fears: the conflicting effects of risk ambiguity », Theory and Decision, 47, p. 153-178.
96. WAKKER P. [2004a], « On the composition of risk preference and belief », Psychological Review, 111, p. 236-241.
97. WAKKER P. [2004b], « Preference Axiomatisations for Decision under Uncertainty », dans GILBOA I. (ed.), Uncertainty in Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of David Schmeidler's 65th Birthday, Londres, Routledge.
98. WAKKER P. et DENEFFE D. [1996], « Eliciting Von Neuman-Morgenstein utilities when probabilities are distorted or unknwon », Management Science, 42 (8), p. 1131-1150.
99. WALLEY P. [1997-2000], « Imprecise probability, The Imprecise Probabilities Project ».
100. WALLEY P. [2000], « Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability », International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 24, p. 125-148.
101. WALLISER B. [2001], « La science économique », dans BERTHELOT J. M. (dir.), épisté-mologie des sciences sociales, Paris, puf, p. 117-147.
102. WALLSTEN T. S. [1990], « The cost and benefit of vague information », dans HOGARTH R. (ed.), Insights in decision making: Theory and applications. A tribute to the late Hillel Einhorn. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
103. WINKLER R. L. [1991], « Ambiguity, probability, preference, and decision analysis », Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, p. 285-297.
104. WU G. et GONZALEZ R. [1996], « Curvature of the probability weighting function », Management Science, 42, p. 1676-1690.
105. WU G. et GONZALEZ R. [1999], Nonlinear decision weights in choice under uncertainty, Management Science, 45 (1), p. 74-85.
106. YATES F., et ZUKOWSKI G. [1976], « Characterization of ambiguity in decision making », Behavioral Science, 21, p. 19-25.