Valuing exit options

Publius: The Journal of Federalism

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 2007, Pages 190-208

  Bednar, Jenna ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 44849115375     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: 17477107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjm001     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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