Excess entry in an experimental winner-take-all market

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 67, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 150-163

  Fischbacher, Urs ^a   Thöni, Christian ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Excess entry; Experiment; Market entry; Winner take all market

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649155026     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.05.018     Document Type: Article

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