Banks as lenders and shareholders: Evidence from Japan

Pacific Basin Finance Journal

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 389-410

  Gao, Wenlian ^a  

^a DOMINICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Bank loan concentration; Firm performance; Main bank debt claims; Main bank equity stakes

Indexed keywords

EID: 44649138764     PISSN: 0927538X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2007.10.003     Document Type: Article

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