Incentives and pricing in communications networks

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 571-592

  Ozdaglar, Asuman ^a   Srikant, R ^b  

^a Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); COSTS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS; QUALITY CONTROL; QUALITY OF SERVICE; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

ALLOCATION MECHANISM; CENTRALIZED CONTROL; COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS; DECENTRALIZED RESOURCE ALLOCATION; MODELING AND CONTROL; PRICING MECHANISM; SELF-INTERESTED AGENTS; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 44449131220     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.024     Document Type: Chapter

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