A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and Annex B countries

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

Volumn 32, Issue 6, 2008, Pages 1830-1856

  Bernard, A ^a   Haurie, A ^b   Vielle, M ^c   Viguier, L ^d  

^a French Ministry of Equipment Transportation and Housing   (France)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GENEVA   (Switzerland)

^c LERNA   (France)

^d Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch and Cie   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

China; Climate change; Computable general equilibrium modeling; Cournot Nash equilibrium; Dynamic games; Emission trading; Kyoto Protocol; Russia

Indexed keywords

EID: 44049097007     PISSN: 01651889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001     Document Type: Article

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