On the relationship between fiscal plans in the European Union: An empirical analysis based on real-time data

Journal of Comparative Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 221-242

  Giuliodori, Massimo ^a,b   Beetsma, Roel ^a,b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^b TINBERGEN INSTITUTE   (Netherlands)

^c CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

European Union; Fiscal policy interdependence; Primary cyclically adjusted deficit; Real time data

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949103733     PISSN: 01475967     EISSN: 10957227     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2007.11.002     Document Type: Article

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