Do Eurozone countries cheat with their budget deficit forecasts?

Kyklos

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 3-15

  Brück, Tilman ^a   Stephan, Andreas ^b  

^a DIW BERLIN   (Germany)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY VIADRINA   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BUDGET DEFICIT; ECONOMETRICS; FORECASTING METHOD; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 33645985554     PISSN: 00235962     EISSN: 14676435     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2006.00317.x     Document Type: Article

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