Leisure and redistribution

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 354-363

  Hodler, Roland ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Heterogeneous preferences; Political economy; Redistribution

Indexed keywords

EID: 43949089520     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.11.001     Document Type: Article

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