Does market demand volatility facilitate collusion?

Economic Modelling

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 696-703

  Wong, Kit Pong ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Cartel defections; Market demand volatility; Real options

Indexed keywords

EID: 43849110444     PISSN: 02649993     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2007.10.010     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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