Optimal timing of defections from price-setting cartels in volatile markets

Economic Modelling

Volumn 23, Issue 5, 2006, Pages 792-804

  Hassan, Shakill ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN   (South Africa)

Author keywords

Cartel defections; Real options; Volatility

Indexed keywords

EID: 33747601147     PISSN: 02649993     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2005.10.007     Document Type: Article

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