Intertemporal emission trading with a dominant agent: How does a restriction on borrowing affect efficiency?

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 40, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 217-232

  Hagem, Cathrine ^a,b   Westskog, Hege ^c  

^a STATISTICS NORWAY   (Norway)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^c CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH OSLO CICERO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Borrowing constraint; Intertemporal trading; Market power; Pollution permits

Indexed keywords

AIR POLLUTION; COST EFFECTIVENESS; SALES;

BORROWING CONSTRAINT; INTERTEMPORAL TRADING; MARKET POWER; POLLUTION PERMITS;

INDUSTRIAL EMISSIONS;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; EMISSIONS TRADING; ENERGY EFFICIENCY; MARKET; POLLUTION TAX;

EID: 43849103956     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-007-9149-9     Document Type: Article

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