A lesson from Argentina: Setting transmission tolls in a competitive auction is much better than regulating them

Energy Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1334-1366

  Galetovic, Alexander ^a   Inostroza, Juan Ricardo ^b  

^a Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales   (Chile)

^b AES Gener SA   (Chile)

Author keywords

Auctions; BOM contract; Comahue; GEEAC; Transener; Transmission

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ELECTRIC LINES; ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; REGULATORY COMPLIANCE; STANDARDS;

SOCIAL WELFARE; TRANSMISSION TOLLS;

ELECTRICITY;

COMPETITIVENESS; COST; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; MODELING; REGULATORY FRAMEWORK; WELFARE IMPACT;

ARGENTINA; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 43449132764     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2008.01.009     Document Type: Article

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