Governance of competitive transmission investment in weak institutional systems

Energy Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 1306-1320

  Abdala, Manuel A ^a  

^a Law and Economics Consulting Group   (United States)

Author keywords

Clubs; Electricity institutions; Electricity pool; Transmission governance; Transmission investment

Indexed keywords

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS; ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; INVESTMENTS;

COMPETITIVE TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT; REGULATORY INTERVENTION; TRANSMISSION GOVERNANCE; TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT;

ELECTRICITY;

COMPETITIVENESS; ECONOMIC ANALYSIS; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INVESTMENT;

ARGENTINA; CENTRAL AMERICA; EL SALVADOR [CENTRAL AMERICA]; PERU; SOUTH AMERICA;

EID: 43449108561     PISSN: 01409883     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2007.12.009     Document Type: Article

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