A computational framework for institutional agency

Artificial Intelligence and Law

Volumn 16, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 25-52

  Governatori, Guido ^a   Rotolo, Antonino ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Agent societies; Counts as; Defeasible logic; Institutional agency

Indexed keywords

LOGIC PROGRAMMING; MODAL ANALYSIS; PROBLEM SOLVING;

AGENT SOCIETIES; DEFEASIBLE LOGIC; INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY;

COMPUTATIONAL METHODS;

EID: 43449093134     PISSN: 09248463     EISSN: 15728382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10506-007-9056-y     Document Type: Article

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